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Rereading a Canonical Copyright Case: 
The Nonexistent Right to Hoard in  
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal 
by SHANE D. VALENZI* 
Abstract 
 Do copyright owners have the right to hoard their creative works? The 
right to exclude on an individual basis is the keystone of copyright law, yet 
using copyright protection to prevent all public access to a work runs 
counter to the very premises upon which copyright law is based.  This right 
to exclude the world from use of a creative work—referred to as the right 
to “hoard” by Justice O’Connor in Stewart v. Abend, is commonly traced to 
a Lochner-era tax case: Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal.  This article examines the 
right to hoard and its origins in Fox Film, concluding that no such right can 
be properly read into the language of the case, and that the right to hoard in 
copyright law in fact remains an open question.  Next, this article examines 
the compatibility of the right to hoard with both Lockean property theory 
and the economic utilitarian theory that underlies copyright law, ultimately 
concluding that both theories emphatically reject the possibility of an 
authorial right to hoard.  Finally, this article posits a purely judiciary 
correction that could effectively eliminate the right to hoard on a domestic 
level without necessitating a change in the Copyright Act, as well as a 
potential international restriction on the right to hoard through an 
expansion of the appendix to the TRIPS Agreement. 
* Law Clerk, United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, 2013–14.  Editor
in Chief, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 2012–13.  J.D., Vanderbilt
University Law School 2013.  The Author would like to thank Professor Daniel Gervais, Ph.D.,
for his guidance and support throughout the development of this Article.
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Copyright is an exclusionary right.1  It does not grant an affirmative 
right for a copyright owner to use his work; rather, it protects a copyright 
owner’s right to exclude others from the work.2  In the United States, 
granting this exclusionary monopoly is done for the benefit of the public, in 
the hope that granting authors exclusive economic control over their 
creative output will provide the necessary incentive for more authors to 
create and distribute more works to the public.3  Any benefit to an author is 
secondary, and rewarding an author for his creative labors is only for the 
benefit of the public, not as a means to an end itself.4  This “public benefit” 
rationale, coupled with an owner’s right to exclude others for a limited 
time, makes copyright law similar to patent law in both theory and 
practice.5  Ultimately, both copyright and patent law are statutory rights 
created by Congress, and can be modified by that body at will.6 
Each of the above propositions is a building block of scholarly 
discourse on copyright law.  Scholars and judges have written extensively 
about each in turn.  Some propositions, like the public benefit rationale 
1. E.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
2. E.g., id.
3. E.g., id. at 127–28.
4. E.g., id. at 127.
5. E.g., id.
6. E.g., id.
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underlying copyright law, are not particularly controversial.7  Others, like 
the interchangeability of copyright and patent law, are more hotly debated.8  
But all of these propositions appeared in a single Lochner-era Supreme 
Court case whose citation count continues to increase exponentially with 
each passing year: Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal.9  Despite the age of this 
Depression-era case, Fox Film has been cited far more often in the past two 
decades than it ever was when the decision was fresh, most often for the 
proposition that copyright rewards the labor of authors in order to benefit 
the public.10 
But Fox Film has increasingly stood for another proposition, one barely 
found in the text of the case itself: That an author has the right to hoard his 
copyright and exclude the work from the public for the full term of 
copyright protection.11  Why an author would want to remove public access 
to his work could be moral in nature (i.e., an author may be dissatisfied 
with the quality of his work) or economically motivated (to increase 
demand for that work or another, related work, or to prevent reputational 
harm which could translate to decreased profitability).  Two real-world 
examples may be instructive. 
First, and perhaps most famously, Disney’s 1946 live action-animated 
mash-up Song of the South has not been available to the public in any form 
since 1986; despite its iconic song “Zip-ah-dee-doo-dah” and its 
preservation in Disney World’s Splash Mountain ride, the film itself was 
protested at the time it was released as being overtly racially offensive, and 
has been buried in the ominous “Disney Vault” for more than two 
7. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”); Alina Ng, When 
Users Are Authors: Authorship in the Age of Digital Media, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 853, 
868–69 (2010) (“Copyright law has conventionally aimed to provide enough economic incentive 
for authors to encourage the creation of literary and artistic works for public benefit.”). 
8. Compare, e.g., Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217 (“Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive
right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea 
itself.”), with eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (“Like a patent owner, a 
copyright holder possesses ‘the right to exclude others from using his property.’”  (citing Fox 
Film, 286 U.S. at 127)). 
9. Fox Film, 286 U.S. at 127–28.
10. E.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also
infra text accompanying note 88. 
11. E.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228–29 (1990) (“But nothing in the copyright
statutes would prevent an author from hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright. 
In fact, this Court has held that a copyright owner has the capacity arbitrarily to refuse to license 
one who seeks to exploit the work.”  (citing Fox Film, 286 U.S. at 127)). 
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decades.12  Complaints from the NAACP during the 1940s that the film 
depicted an “idyllic slave-master relationship” based on the Uncle Remus 
stories of Joel Chandler and stereotyped “tar baby” sequences, among other 
controversial content, have discouraged Disney from releasing the film to 
the public in any form.13  Most born after 1980 or so have likely never seen 
the film, and those who have seen it likely did so via unlicensed and 
technically infringing means.14 
Another less familiar example concerns the script to Leonard 
Bernstein’s Candide.  Based on Voltaire’s novel of the same name, 
esteemed playwright Lillian Hellman penned the original script for the 
1956 Broadway premiere.15  This script is unavailable to modern 
companies and audiences, however; stock and amateur companies wishing 
to mount a new production of Candide are limited to either the Harold 
Prince-produced revival from the 1970s (with a new script by Hugh 
Wheeler) or the late 1990s Royal National Theatre Revival (with an even 
newer script by John Caird).16  While the later revivals were modestly 
12. See John Lingan, Bristling Dixie, SLATE (Jan. 4, 2013, 11:36 PM), http://www.
slate.com/articles/arts/books/2013/01/song_of_the_south_disney_s_most_notorious_film_by_jas
on_sperb_reviewed.html. 
13. See Barbara Mikkelson & David P. Mikkelson, Song of the South, SNOPES,
http://www.snopes.com/disney/films/sots.asp (last updated Aug. 21, 2007). 
14. See Lingan, supra note 12; see also Christian E. Willis, Frequently Asked Questions,
SONGOFTHESOUTH, http://www.songofthesouth.net/faq/index.html (last updated Apr. 8, 2013). 
For years, a rumor persisted that Bill Cosby had purchased the rights to Song of the South and The 
Little Rascals in order to prevent the films from being shown anywhere due to their objectionable 
depiction of African American stereotypes.  While this behavior would have been perfect for the 
subject of this article, these rumors are, sadly, untrue.  See, e.g., Barbara Mikkelson & David P. 
Mikkelson, The Little Rascals, SNOPES, http://www.snopes.com/radiotv/tv/rascals.asp (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2007); Mikkelson & Mikkelson, supra note 13. 
15. See Candide, INTERNET BROADWAY DATABASE, http://www.ibdb.com/ production.php
?id=2591 (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
16. See Candide (1999), MUSIC THEATRE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.mtishows.com/sho
w_detail.asp?showid=000256 (last visited Apr. 8, 2013); Candide (1974), MUSIC THEATRE 
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.mtishows.com/show_ detail.asp?showid =000016 (last visited Apr. 
8, 2013).  Specifically: 
Michael Stewart, the writer of Hello Dolly!, rewrote Hellman’s book, and then 
Hugh Wheeler, who wrote Sweeney Todd, rewrote Stewart’s rewrite.  In 1989, 
our own John Wells, of Private Eye et al, rewrote Wheeler’s rewrite of 
Stewart’s rewrite of Hellman.  “The old dodo seems very happy with it,” said 
Wells, referring to Bernstein.  But the old dodo is gone now, so the new 
National Theatre version has chucked out Wells’s rewrite of Wheeler’s rewrite 
and replaced it with Les Miserables man John Caird’s rewrite of Wheeler’s 
rewrite. 
See Mark Steyn, The Most Difficult of All Musicals, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Apr. 5, 1999) available 
at www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/471793/the-most-difficult-of-all-musicals.html. 
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successful, the original Broadway production was a flop that reviewers 
blamed on Hellman.17  As a result, Hellman insisted that her name be 
removed from all future productions and refused to license her script to 
anyone for performance, such that today few theatergoers know the script 
ever existed.18 
Can these authors (one an institutional author, the other a flesh-and-
blood author) hoard their creative works in this manner once they have 
been released to the public?  Should they? A “hoarding” right may be 
facially implied under the language of the 1976 Copyright Act, but both 
scenarios in which such hoarding could occur seem to be at odds with the 
underlying “public benefit” rationale of the Act.  Allowing an author to 
restrict public access based on quality concerns does not have a place in the 
economic-rights foundation of the statutorily created right, and allowing a 
third party to restrict access during the full term of copyright protection 
would restrict the spread of new expression to the public.19  And yet, 
relying on Fox Film as precedent, courts (in dicta) and commentators have 
affirmed such a hoarding right without discussion.20   
This article will trace the origins of the “right to hoard” in copyright 
law, concluding that, where such a right was asserted by the judiciary, it 
was done so through a misapplication of the questionable precedent of Fox 
Film.  Part I will examine the actual Fox Film case and decision in detail, 
concluding that the “right to hoard” language was mere dicta intended to 
17. See Brooks Peters, Making Your Garden Growl: Lillian Hellman and Candide, OPERA 
NEWS (July 2000), available at http://www.sondheimguide.com/Candide/ writings12.html. 
Peters describes how: 
Hellman’s contribution was whittled down until there was nothing left of her 
own work.  By the time Hal Prince revived the show in the ’70s with a circus-
like theme, in a small Brooklyn theater, Hellman was fed up with Candide. 
She officially okayed the project but insisted that her name be removed from it 
entirely and blocked any future use of her original script. 
18. See id.
19. See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8; cf. Zohar Efroni, A Momentary Lapse of Reason:
Digital Copyright, the DMCA and a Dose of Common Sense, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 249, 275 
(2005) (“[S]ince accessing a work is an act not equivalent to any of the section 106 exclusive 
rights, . . . copyright law does not secure to authors’ [sic] an access control right.”). 
20. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228–29 (1990); Peter M. Boyle, Penelope M.
Lister, & J. Clayton Everett, Jr., Antitrust Law at the Federal Circuit: Red Light or Green Light at 
the IP-Antitrust Intersection?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 739, 748 (2002) (“The patent and copyright 
laws confer upon patent and copyright owners, respectively, the right to refuse either to license or 
sell products embodying the protected invention or work . . . .  The right to refuse to license one's 
patents or copyrights or to sell patented or copyrighted products follows inherently from the right 
to exclude.  And the courts, including the Supreme Court, have found as much.” (citing Fox Film, 
286 U.S. at 127)). 
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emphasize that copyright was an individual right granted by Congress and 
was not itself a federal instrumentality.  Part I will then trace the 
development of the “right to hoard” precedent by examining the historical 
evolution of cases and commentaries citing to Fox Film, taking special note 
of other landmark cases in developing the modern precedent (particularly 
Stewart v. Abend).  Part II will conclude that interpreting Fox Film as 
evincing the right to hoard is an incorrect reading of the case.  Part III will 
examine the right to hoard normatively by (1) properly framing the right as 
a blanket exclusion of the public following first publication, (2) analyzing 
the right to hoard from a copyright-as-property perspective, and (3) 
reconciling the normative view with the existing caselaw on the issue.  Part 
III will conclude that such a right to hoard, properly cabined, should not 
exist, as it is fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional and 
legislative theories underlying copyright law.  Finally, Part IV will consider 
the practical implementation of eliminating the right to hoard, 
recommending both a domestic solution (encouraging courts to utilize the 
“judicially imposed royalty” option of eBay) and an international solution 
(the expansion of the compulsory license for creative works extended to 
developing countries in the Paris Convention). 
I. An Introduction to Fox Film and Its Citation History
A. Fox Film in Proper Context
Fox Film is a tax case.  In the 1932 Supreme Court decision, the titular
plaintiff challenged the State of Georgia’s ability to tax its gross revenue 
earned from licensing copyrighted films, arguing that copyright was an 
instrumentality of the federal government, and therefore immune from state 
taxation.21  In the third paragraph of a ten-paragraph opinion, Justice 
Hughes introduced the constitutional and statutory foundations of copyright 
law, noting that it was based on the Progress Clause of the Constitution, 
that any production protected by copyright was owned by an author and not 
the United States, and that the copyright itself was the product of a federal 
statute; that is, Congress created a right, rather than sanctioning a 
preexisting one.22  Hughes went on to name the exclusive rights granted to 
an author under the then-current Copyright Act of 1909, pinpointing the 
“exclusive right for a limited period to multiply and vend copies,” in 
21. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 126–27 (1932).
22. See id. at 127 (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661 (1834)).
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particular.23  Justice Hughes made a point of noting that the United States 
had no interest in the production, exercise, or use of a copyright itself, and 
that Congress did not provide that the financial gains of the exercise of a 
copyright (i.e., licensing or sale) should be “free of tax.”24   
Immediately following this point Hughes added the sentence that 
provided the foundation for the right to hoard: “The owner of the copyright, 
if he pleases, may refrain from vending or licensing and content himself 
with simply exercising the right to exclude others from using his 
property.”25  In the next sentence, Hughes summarized the purpose of U.S. 
copyright law in the most cited assertion of the case: “The sole interest of 
the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in 
the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”26  To 
conclude this single paragraph that would later prove to be a powerhouse 
for future citations, Hughes noted that copyright law, like patent law, 
functions essentially as an exchange of benefits between the public and a 
creator: the public grants the creator the benefit of a copyright or patent in 
exchange for the public benefit conferred by such creation or invention, 
and to incentivize future creation and invention (which would, 
presumptively, also be shared with the public).27 
The remaining seven paragraphs introduced the principle that a federal 
instrumentality cannot be taxed by a state, then clarified that, because the 
United States did not own the copyright at issue (or, in fact, any copyright 
whatsoever), the copyright itself as the property of a private party was 
subject to state taxation.28  Hughes analogized ownership of a copyright to 
property purchased under U.S. public land laws (which is not taxable when 
owned by the United States but becomes taxable as soon as the land 
changes hands and a private party purchases it).29  The only hint as to why 
Justice Hughes elaborated on the scope of what a copyright owner may do 
with his rights in the context of the tax issue in the case comes in the final 
three sentences of paragraph eight which are rarely, if ever, cited: 




26. Fox Film Corp., 286 U.S.at 127.
27. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127–28 (1932).
28. See id. at 129 (“[T]he mere fact that a property right is created by statute to fulfill a
governmental purpose does not make it nontaxable when it is held in private ownership and 
exercised for private advantage.”). 
29. See id.
 
96 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [36:1
After the copyright has been granted, the government has no 
interest in any action under it save the general one that its laws 
shall be obeyed.  Operations of the owner in multiplying copies, in 
sales, in performances or exhibitions, or in licensing others for 
such purposes, are manifestly not the operations of the government.  
A tax upon the gains derived from such operations is not a tax upon 
the exertion of any governmental function.30 
Far from asserting an affirmative right to hoard, then, Justice Hughes’s 
intent was more likely to extrapolate an extreme use of a copyright owner’s 
right to exclude in order to illustrate the federal government’s complete 
lack of interest in the private exercise of a copyright.  Justice Hughes 
concluded the opinion with an assertion that patents and copyrights work 
more or less the same, and overruled a prior Supreme Court case holding 
that states could not tax patent royalties.31 
A few takeaways from the full case analysis are instructive.  First, the 
“right to exclude” language is inarguably dicta; it has very little to do with 
the actual issue of the case other than as a hypothetical example of the 
federal government’s lack of interest in private exercise of a copyright. 
Second, substantially more language (that has generated substantially more 
citations) in the case is devoted to the “public benefit” rationale of 
copyright protection being paramount over authorial reward or control, a 
principle that seems to be at odds with a draconian right to exclude. 
Finally, Justice Hughes explicitly characterized copyright as a property 
right of the author, and made no distinction between an intellectual 
property right and a real property right, which may help to explain his 
willingness to include a total right of exclusion as part of the statutorily 
30. Id. at 130.
31. See id. at 131.
[I]n this aspect royalties from copyrights stand in the same position as royalties
from the use of patent rights, and what we have said as to the purposes of the
government in relation to copyrights applies as well, mutatis mutandis, to
patents which are granted under the same constitutional authority to promote
the progress of science and useful arts.  The affirmance of the judgment in the
instant case cannot be reconciled with the decision in Long v. Rockwood, upon
which appellant relies, and, in view of the conclusions now reached upon a re-
examination of the question, that case is definitely overruled.
Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
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granted rights of a copyright owner (due to the preeminence of the right to 
exclude in real property law).32  
Despite these takeaways, Fox Film is still primarily (and exclusively) a 
classic Lochner-era case, limiting federal power (to prohibit state tax on 
federal instrumentalities) and championing personal autonomy and minimal 
federal involvement in both state and personal affairs.33  The following 
section will trace the historical treatment of the case, and, in particular, how 
the case evolved from being solely about state taxation power to something 
else entirely. 
B. The Citation History of Fox Film
Courts, treatises, and law review articles have cited Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal for more than a half-dozen unrelated propositions.34  Following the 
Supreme Court’s citation to Fox Film in Stewart v. Abend in 1990, 
however, the case has enjoyed a renaissance in relevance—over eighty 
percent of law review citations to the case come after 1990.35  This section 
will examine the treatment of Fox Film by the Supreme Court, circuit, 
district, and state courts, and legal commentators from the year of the 
decision (1932) to the present day, organized into three discrete periods of 
time: 1932–1956 (the “tax” era), 1957–1990 (the “pre-Stewart” era), and 
1990–2012 (the “post-Stewart” era). 
1. The Tax Era (1932–1956)
For the first twenty four years following the decision, neither the
Supreme Court nor a single legal commentator referenced Fox Films as 
evincing the right to exclude.36  The Supreme Court cited Fox Film eleven 
times from 1932–1954, eight of which were to reiterate the holding of the 
case—that a private privilege extended by the federal government is not a 
32. See Fox Film Corp., 286 U.S. at 127 (“The production to which the protection of
copyright may be accorded is the property of the author and not of the United States.”); id. at 
128–29 (analogizing a copyright owner’s property right to both the property rights of a recipient 
of a US land grant and the authorized discoverer of minerals on US land). 
33. See Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE L.J.
1513, 1535 (2002) (arguing that the Court at constructed at the time it decided Fox Film evinced 
“increasingly anxious efforts to maintain the spheres of federal and state power as distinct and 
mutually exclusive.”). 
34. See supra notes 1–6.
35. As of March 4, 2013, Westlaw lists 514 law journal articles referencing Fox Film, with
eighty percent of those citations occurring after 1990.  A Lexis search for the same citation 
reveals 406 citing references to the case, with ninety percent occurring in or after 1990. 
36. Supra note 35.
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federal instrumentality and thus is not exempt from state tax.37  The year 
1945 marked the Court’s first departure from the purely tax holding of the 
case, where Fox Film appeared as part of a string cite in Special Equipment 
v. Coe to support the proposition that the failure of a patentee to use a
patented invention doesn’t affect the validity of a patent.38  The Court laid
the groundwork for treatment of Fox Film as a copyright case in 1948 in
United States v. Paramount Pictures, an antitrust case holding that block-
booking (the practice of film producers conditioning a license to display a
popular film at a movie theater on that theater also licensing a less popular
film at a similar rate) was an improper enlargement of a copyright
monopoly.39  The Court cited Fox Film in support of the assertion that the
purpose of copyright is primarily for the benefit of the public, and any
benefit to the author is a secondary consideration at best.40  Citing the
“labor of authors” language of Fox Film, Paramount would prove to be the
case that kept Fox Film alive in the public conscious for future references,
as the same labor-of-authors language would appear again (often with
reference to Paramount as well as Fox Film) in eight of the eleven
Supreme Court decisions between 1948 and 2012 citing the case.41
Similarly, the legal commentary on Fox Film from 1932–1956 is 
focused on tax.  More than a dozen articles published in those years 
reference Fox Film only for its tax implications,42 and the small handful 
that do not instead use Justice Hughes’s casual overruling of Long v. 
Rockwood as a discussion point for the Supreme Court’s practice of 
overruling cases.43  The notable exception to this trend, and the first 
commentary directly addressing the issue of this article, appeared in a note 
in the Columbia Law Review in 1956, where, in a piece on parody and 
infringement, the author digressed (in a footnote): 
37. See, e.g., Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178, 180 (1933).
38. 324 U.S. 370, 378–79 (1945).
39. See 334 U.S. 131, 143 (1948).
40. Id. at 158.
41. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 231 (2006); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
214 (1954).  Of the three cases citing Fox Film, but not for the “labor of authors” language, two 
of them (Stewart v. Abend and eBay v. MercExchange, LLC) will be discussed in greater detail in 
Part I.B.3 for their assertion of the author’s right to exclude.  The third case, Nat’l League of 
Cities v. Usery, is another tax case.  426 U.S. 833, 866 (1976). 
42. See, e.g., Note, Constitutionality of State Privilege Tax on Cotton Brokers, 43 YALE L.J.
337, 339 (1933). 
43. See, e.g., Malcolm P. Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication—A Study of
Modified and Overruled Decisions, 46 HARV. L. REV. 361, 364 (1933). 
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The constitutional justification for the right of [a] non-user is not as 
obvious as that for economic rights.  Indeed, the proposition that 
the arts are promoted by the permissive stifling of artistic works, 
even by their creators, seems paradoxical.  The apparent 
inconsistency is minimized when it is considered that if this right 
were denied, and the author was not permitted to prevent 
publication of works he thinks are unworthy of perpetuation, 
artistic integrity and pride would suffer and, as a result, authors 
would be discouraged from producing.  To those authors for which 
the non-economic spurs to creation are the greatest, this right to 
protect one’s artistic reputation would be particularly valuable and 
effective in encouraging creativity.44 
This particular student author was far ahead of the time, however, as 
the right to exclude would not appear in commentary again until 1979,45 
and wouldn’t appear outside the narrow context of a footnote to a student 
note in the Columbia Law Review until after the Sony v. Universal decision 
in 1984.46 
Lower courts were more varied in their use and understanding of Fox 
Film.  Twelve of seventeen circuit court decisions citing Fox Film at this 
time still did so purely for its tax holding,47 while two of the remaining five 
noted that an inventor’s nonuse48 or absolute exclusion of the public49 
would not compel the loss of patent rights.  Of the remaining three 
decisions, one was a post-Paramount decision that cited the soon-to-be-
ubiquitous “labor of authors” language,50 while the other two dealt with a 
copyright owner’s rights more directly.  Interstate Hotel Co. v. Remick 
Music Corp. cited Fox Film for the proposition that copyright owners may 
exercise either the right to publish and vend their work, the right to publicly 
perform their work, or both.51  Notably, the case did not mention an 
owner’s right to refuse to exercise either right.  More directly, Leon v. 
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., in an opinion delivered five years after 
44. Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 588 n.12 (1956).
45. See Celia Goldwag, Note, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 320, 339 n.122 (1979).  The fact that the only two on-point commentaries on the 
issue prior to the Sony case both appeared as footnotes to student notes in the same journal 
appears to be coincidental, as the later note does not cite the earlier note. 
46. See infra Part I.B.3.
47. E.g., Buckley v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 66 F.2d 394, 396 (2d Cir. 1933).
48. Hartford-Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 71 F.2d 539, 566 (8th Cir. 1934).
49. Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 144 F.2d 497, 502 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
50. Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550, 572 (4th Cir. 1950).
51. 157 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir. 1946).
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Fox Film, cited the case for the proposition that a unique arrangement of 
copyrighted material was not a permissible fair use merely because the 
holder of the copyright had not used (that is, arranged) it in that manner.52 
Published district court decisions citing Fox Film in this time period 
were much more varied (and rare) in their uses of the case.  In fact, fewer 
than a dozen published district court decisions during this time cited to Fox 
Film at all, and four of them did so in support of a copyright owner’s right 
to exclude.53  In Buck v. Hillsgrove Country Club, the court struck two 
paragraphs from a plaintiff’s complaint that the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) impermissibly violated 
antitrust laws and cited Fox Film as part of a collection of cases 
demonstrating that Congress failed to insert any explicit limitations on a 
copyright owner’s right to exclude.54  Paine v. Electrical Research 
Products permitted a manufacturer of equipment to play music during 
silent films to avoid payment on a contract with a music agent where the 
agent’s clients didn’t actually own the foreign distribution rights the 
manufacturer was paying for; Fox Films was used to support the court’s 
assertion that the agent’s clients need not have licensed their work at all, 
concluding that since they did, their representations must be accurate to 
compel payment under the contract.55  Loew’s, Inc. v. CBS contained a fact 
pattern similar to Leon and, as it was a district court case located within the 
Ninth Circuit, both relied on Leon as precedent and cited Fox Film for the 
same proposition.56  Finally, Inge v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 
used the right to exclude language from Fox Film immediately following 
an assertion of the plaintiff’s affirmative right to license his copyright, 
likely to indicate that the plaintiff, the copyright owner of a play, had the 
right to license or not license the right to make a film version of the play to 
52. See 91 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 1937).  The subject matter at issue in Leon was the
arrangement of names in a phone book, famously held to be uncopyrightable more than fifty 
years later in Feist Pub’s v. Rural Tel. Svs. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (citing the Leon 
court as having “misunderstood the [1909 Copyright Act]”).  Because Feist rendered the subject 
matter of Leon uncopyrightable, but did not disturb the holding of Leon concerning the use (or 
lack thereof) of copyrighted material in the abstract, the reasoning of the Leon court is still 
relevant to the analysis in this article. 
53. See infra notes 54–57.
54. Buck v. Hillsgrove Country Club, 17 F. Supp. 643, 645 (D.R.I. 1937).
55. 27 F. Supp. 780, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
56. See 131 F. Supp. 165, 184 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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defendants at will.57  Additionally, nearly every published state case citing 
Fox Film in this era did so to support a similar tax holding.58 
The principal takeaway from this era of jurisprudence is that for more 
than two decades following the Fox Film decision, the overwhelming 
majority of decisions citing to the case treated it exclusively as a tax case. 
In those rare occurrences where the right to exclude was cited, it was done 
so 1) in dicta and 2) as part of a general affirmance of the scope of a 
copyright owner’s monopoly power, without any treatment or thought of 
what impact the exertion of a blanket right to exclude would have on the 
public. 
2. The Pre-Stewart Era: 1957–1989
The arbitrary separation of analysis following 1956 does not follow a
particular case of consequence; rather, 1956 marks a natural break in 
jurisprudence citing the case itself.  The Supreme Court did not cite Fox 
Film from 1954–1962, no circuit court cited the case from 1950–1968, and 
no district court cited the case from 1956–1975.59  No state case cited Fox 
Film from 1956–1961.60 And only nine law review articles cited Fox Film 
from 1956–1979 (compared to seventy-eight articles from 1979–1990 and 
413 from 1990-2012).61  The reasons for this lull may be temporal; the case 
would have been nearly thirty years old, and slowly replaced with more 
recent precedent. More interesting than its waning lack of influence with 
the passage of time is the case’s sudden resurgence as precedence.  It was a 
series of fortuitous and influential citations that reversed the case’s 
seemingly inevitable path to obscurity. 
First, the “labors of authors” language was revived by the Supreme 
Court in 1975 in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, which held that a 
radio broadcast in a restaurant did not constitute a public performance, and 
57. See 143 F. Supp. 294, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).  Licensing the derivative right, particularly
as regards “versioning,” may contain a special protection that licensing other rights do not have; 
see infra Part III.C. 
58. E.g., Stone v. Stapling Mach. Co., 221 Miss. 555, 565 (1954).
59. See United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46–47 (1962); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
210, 214 (1954); City of Paris, Ky. v. Fed. Pwr. Comm’n, 399 F.2d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 1977); 
Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550, 572 (4th Cir. 1950); Mills Music, Inc. 
v. State of Ariz., 1975 WL 21095 (D. Ariz.); Inge, 143 F. Supp. at 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
60. See Appeal of Baltimore & O.R.R., 405 Pa. 349, 355 (1961); Columbia River Bridge
Co. v. State, 46 Wash. 2d 385, 390 (1955). 
61. These numbers reflect the citation references Westlaw and Lexis associate with Fox
Film, organized by date. 
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has become standard reading for students of copyright law.62  Although the 
next citation following Aiken was, again, a tax case,63 the Court revisited 
Fox Film extensively in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc.64  The Court, tasked with determining the legality of time-shifting 
devices (i.e., VCRs), ultimately held that VCRs had the potential for 
“substantial non-infringing uses,” which precluded a finding of 
contributory infringement.65  In reaching this determination, the Court also 
revisited nearly ever pertinent judicial interpretation of Fox Film along the 
way.  The majority quoted the language from Paramount, which was 
actually Justice Hughes’s language from Fox Film, noting that reward to 
authors is merely a secondary consideration of copyright law.66  The 
majority also quoted from Aiken, which in turn quoted Fox Film’s “labor of 
authors” language.67  Further, Fox Film’s tax-related holding is cited to 
support the proposition that “[copyright] protection has never accorded the 
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his work.”68  
Finally, the Court relies on Fox Film as an example of the “historic 
kinship” between patent and copyright law as a precursor to justifying the 
importation of the “substantial noninfringing uses” doctrine from patent 
jurisprudence.69  
However thorough the majority’s treatment of the case, Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent actually provides what would later become the 
majority reading of Fox Film.  Citing it first for the carefully stated 
proposition that “[t]he monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the 
individual author in order to benefit the public,”70 and thereby emphasizing 
the individual reward over the public benefit, Justice Blackmun later uses 
Fox Film to support his contention that “[c]opyright gives the author a right 
to limit or even to cut off access to his work.”71  This extension of Fox Film 
was brand new to the Court, but would become codified in the majority 
opinion (which Justice Blackmun joined) in Stewart v. Abend.72 
62. E.g., JULIE E. COHEN, LYDIA PALLAS LOREN, RUTH L. OKEDIJI, & PAUREEN A.
O’ROURKE, COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 412–13 (3d ed. 2010). 
63. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 866 (1976) (cited as eroding claimed
federal immunities to state tax). 
64. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
65. Id. at 456.
66. Id. at 429.
67. Id. at 432.
68. Id. at 432 n.13.
69. Id. at 439 & n.19.
70. Sony Corp. of Am., 466 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 480.
72. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228–29 (1990).
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After Sony, fueled perhaps by Justice Blackmun’s dissent, citations to 
Fox Film as justification for the right to exclude began to manifest for the 
first time in legal commentary, appearing at least a half-dozen times 
between Sony and Stewart (1984–1990).73  After Stewart, citations to Fox 
Film in general skyrocketed, but before examining that decision and its 
impact on the right to exclude, it is worth pondering: where did the right to 
hoard argument come from? 
The robust defense of an author’s right to refuse to license to anyone 
most likely originated in 1977 with the Authors’ League of America 
(“ALA”) and an amicus brief the ALA filed in Rohauer v. Killam Shows, 
Inc.74  At issue in Rohauer was the grant and renewal of the underlying 
copyright of a literary work that had been turned into a movie.75  Though 
the original author had granted the studio both the initial and renewal rights 
in his work, her daughter (who controlled the renewal rights after the 
author passed away) refused to re-grant the expiring rights in the 
underlying literary work used in the already-released film.76  The ALA 
argued in their brief, according to the Second Circuit, that the “force” of the 
renewal rights includes the right to refrain from vending or licensing and to 
exclude everyone from the work.77  Ultimately, the court disagreed with the 
plaintiff and the ALA, holding that the owner of an underlying right cannot 
prevent the distribution and exercise of a derivative work based on that 
right where the work was initially created with a valid license.78  This 
opinion was not cited in the final Supreme Court decision in Sony, but was 
cited at the circuit court level, suggesting the Sony court was familiar with 
it.79  Interestingly, despite the Ninth Circuit’s singling out of the 
unqualified right to exclude as a key component of the ALA’s argument, 
the ALA General Counsel at the time delivered a published address to the 
Copyright Society of the U.S.A. during the Rohauer deliberations 
specifically about the key arguments in the Rohauer amicus brief, but 
failed to mention protecting an author’s unqualified right to exclude as any 
73. E.g., Edward Allan Jeffords, Home Audio Recording After Betamax: Taking a Fresh
Look, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 855, 857 n.16 (1984) (arguing that Sony disagreed with Fox Film’s 
stated right to exclude by noting that an author has no right to exclude fair uses of his work). 
74. 551 F.2d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Irwin Karp, From Roth to Rohauer: Twenty
Years of Amicus Briefs, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 (1977) (describing the fervor with 
which the ALA filed amicus briefs in copyright cases from 1957–1977). 
75. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 487.
76. Id. at 486–87.
77. Id. at 488.
78. Id. at 494.
79. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972 n.10 (9th Cir.
1981). 
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aspect of their argument, much less the most important one.80  
Nevertheless, it is likely that the Authors’ League brief was the first legal 
document to frame, consider, and advocate for a full authorial right to 
hoard.81 
Until 1990, the right to exclude appeared very little in federal 
jurisprudence generally, and, while the right was usually associated with 
Fox Film, it was hardly the proposition most associated with the case.82  
But in 1990, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Stewart v. Abend 
thrust the right to exclude, and, with it, what could be considered a 
misreading of Fox Film (or, at least, a reading out of context) back into the 
forefront of legal consciousness.83  The fact pattern of Stewart was similar 
to Rohauer; that is, the heirs of the author of the underlying rights to a film 
sought to withhold permission for their ancestor’s work to continue to be 
used in the film once the initial term of copyright had expired.84  In finding 
for the plaintiffs (and holding that the creators of a work used in a 
derivative work still control the underlying rights to the work once the 
initial grant of rights expires), Justice O’Connor noted in dicta: “Nothing in 
the copyright statutes would prevent an author from hoarding all his works 
during the term of copyright. . . .  A copyright owner has the capacity 
arbitrarily to refuse to license one who seeks to exploit the work.”85  The 
only cite to support these propositions was, of course, Fox Film.86  
Obviously influenced strongly by Rohauer, Stewart did not explicitly 
overrule the older case.  Though it reached the opposite conclusion 
regarding control of a derivative work following the expiration of the 
80. See Karp, supra note 74 at 16–17.
81. At the very least, it was the first document to gain traction at the federal level, as far as
this author can tell. 
82. Before 1990, Fox Film was more often cited for the propositions that (1) copyright is
not a federal instrumentality, e.g., Paris, Ky. v. Fed. Pwr. Comm’n, 399 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 
1968); (2) copyright is designed for the public benefit by rewarding the labors of authors, e.g., 
Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550, 572 (4th Cir. 1950); (3) copyright is a 
statutory right created by Congress, not a natural right, e.g., Assoc. Film Distr. Corp. v. 
Thornburgh, 683 F.2d 808, 815 (3d Cir. 1982); and, (4) patent law and copyright law are closely 
analogous, and provisions of one body of law can help inform the other body, e.g., Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).  Even in legal commentary, which 
is freer to extrapolate meaning, Fox Film was just as often used as a discussion point for the 
principle of stare decisis in the 1930s as it was as support for the right to exclude between 1932–
1990.  Compare Sharp, supra note 43 (stare decisis), with L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, 
Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory 
Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 749 (1989) (right to exclude). 
83. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
84. Id. at 211–15.
85. Id. at 228–29 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 126–27 (1932)).
86. Id.
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ownership of rights in an underlying work, Justice O’Connor reframed the 
holding of Rohauer as mandating a balancing of the equities based on the 
state of the law and the facts of the case, not prescribing a particular 
result.87 
Here, for the first time, was an explicit assertion of an author’s right to 
hoard.  Though never again would such a right be stated so forcefully or 
eloquently at the Supreme Court level, the assertion would create a new 
and robust interest in Fox Film as relevant precedent for the purposes of 
copyright law generally, along with the only precedent for a copyright 
owner’s right to exclude. 
3. The Post-Stewart Era: 1990–2012
Following the Stewart decision, citations to Fox Film exploded.  The
case is primarily cited for its “labors of authors” language stating that 
copyright law was crafted by Congress for the benefit of the public; it has 
been cited more than 300 times for this proposition in the last twenty 
years.88  It has been used to support an author’s right to exclude a little over 
fifty times in that same period—a paltry number in comparison to the 
public benefit proposition, but exponentially more than the case had ever 
been used to support such a proposition before Stewart.89  Clearly, then, the 
right to exclude is still not the primary use of Fox Film, or anything close 
to it.  But the reverse is also true: Fox Film is, indeed, the most common 
citation to support an author’s right to hoard.90 
At the Supreme Court level, Fox Film has become a go-to citation for 
copyright cases.  New York Times v. Tasini,91 Eldred v. Ashcroft,92 and 
Golan v. Holder93 all cite Fox Film for its “labors of authors” language. 
Most importantly for the purposes of this analysis, eBay v. MercExchange, 
though technically establishing an analysis to determine the remedy for 
87. See id. at 209, 227.
88. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 902 (2012).
89. These numbers were obtained through searches for citation references to Fox Film on
both Westlaw and Lexis. 
90. Where the right to exclude is mentioned without a Fox Film cite, a citation to the more
bombastic language in Stewart usually appears in its place.  See, e.g., Robert A Kreiss, 
Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1995) (citing 
Stewart for the right to exclude, but not Fox Film). 
91. 533 U.S. 483, 519 (2001).
92. 537 U.S. 186, 231 (2003).
93. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
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patent infringement, has since been extended in full to copyright 
infringement remedies,94 and cited Fox Film for the right to exclude.95 
The trend extends to courts of appeals as well; following Stewart, the 
right to exclude picked up dramatically at the circuit court level, often 
citing both Stewart and Fox Film.96  The right is not always treated 
favorably, either.97  In Data General Corp. v. Gramman Systems Support 
Corp., the First Circuit parsed the language in both Fox Film and Stewart, 
emerging with three key conclusions: (1) a copyright owner may refrain 
from vending and licensing because the Congressionally created system 
promotes consumer (i.e., public) welfare by encouraging investment; (2) 
although nothing in the Copyright Act itself would prevent hoarding (citing 
the Stewart language), nothing would prevent other acts of Congress from 
preventing that sort of activity, and the Sherman Act in particular could 
prevent hoarding where a monopolist harms consumers by refusing to 
license a copyrighted work to a competitor; and, (3) a copyright owner’s 
unilateral refusal to license a copyright to a particular entity should be 
considered a “presumptively valid business decision” for the purposes of 
the Sherman Act, with the burden on the rejected licensee to prove 
anticompetitive practices.98  Though the Data General decision is narrow 
in scope, and ultimately favored a copyright owner’s refusal to license, it 
set statutory limitations on the right (at least in the First Circuit), which 
underscores the greater point that a copyright owner’s right to exclude is 
far from natural or moral; it is based on a purely economic concern. 
From its roots as a tax case, Fox Film has through a series of fortuitous 
citations (Paramount, Rohauer, Sony, Stewart, and eBay, in particular) 
reemerged and reinvented itself as a bulwark of copyright theory and 
policy.  The unfettered right to exclude, in particular, after lying unnoticed 
for over half a century, emerged almost overnight as one of the central 
holdings of the case.  But such a characterization is not necessarily fair.  It 
94.  See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We hold today that eBay
applies with equal force (a) to preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for alleged copyright 
infringement.”). 
95. 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (“Like a patent owner, a copyright holder possesses ‘the right
to exclude others from using his property.’”  (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 126–
27 (1932)). 
96. E.g., Orson v. Mirimax Film Corp., 189 F.3d 377, 390 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Stewart
and Fox Film for the proposition that a copyright owner has the capacity to refuse to license); 
Image Tech. Svs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that a 
copyright holder may refuse to sell or license the work, but applying the concept to patent law 
only, and relying on patent-exclusive citations in addition to Stewart and Fox Film). 
97. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Gramman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186–87 (1st Cir.
1994). 
98. Id.
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is unlikely nearly sixty years of judges and scholars erred by failing to 
ascribe the “right to hoard” to the case before Justice O’Connor’s bit of 
dicta.  The next Part will analyze this proposition in more detail; that is, it 
will argue why interpreting Fox Film as asserting the right to hoard is an 
improper reading of the case. 
II. Why Fox Film Does Not Support a Modern Right to Hoard
Citing Fox Film to support copyright owners’ rights to refuse to license
their works has become common, even by esteemed copyright scholars.99  
But is such a leap of understanding justified?  This part argues that no, it is 
not.   
First, the right to exclude is dictum from the case.  It had no bearing on 
the essential holding that copyright is not a federal instrumentality and thus 
not exempt from state tax.  A proper understanding of its presence in the 
opinion can be found in the (winning) Appellee’s Brief, which used the 
right to exclude only as evidence that imposing a tax did not abrogate a 
copyright owner’s statutorily granted rights:  
A tax on royalties paid under a license from the owner of a 
copyright . . . interferes only indirectly and remotely with the 
copyright, the franchise granted by the government. It lessens to 
some extent the amount of income which the owner of the 
copyright would otherwise receive from it, but it does not diminish 
the right given by the United States to exclude others from 
“making, using, or vending the thing” copyrighted. That right is 
just as full and complete with the tax as without it. The tax does not 
make the privilege less exclusive.100 
The Court was not expounding on or analyzing the limits of the right to 
exclude in any way; this would have been overreaching.  Rather, the Court 
was simply attempting to restate the law as it currently existed (under the 
Copyright Act of 1909) in order to emphasize that a state tax on royalties 
would not alter the fundamental character of the rights themselves.  Under 
the Copyright Act of 1909, a copyright owner (specifically, “any person 
99. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New
Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
929, 977 (2003) (“Copyright in its most traditional form is illustrated in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 
in which the Supreme Court stated, ‘The owner of the copyright if he pleases may refrain from 
vending or licensing, and content himself with simply exercising the right to exclude others from 
using his property.’” (footnote omitted)). 
100. Brief for Appellee, Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 1932 WL 33528, at *18 (emphasis added).
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entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this Act”) had “the 
exclusive right . . . to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted 
work,” as well as the exclusive rights of translation and public 
performance.101  In addition, an “author” (as opposed to “any person 
entitled thereto . . .”) of an unpublished work retained a full common-law 
right “to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work 
without his consent . . . .”102  The implication, therefore, is that some 
circumstances exist in which the owner of a copyright may not exercise his 
right to exclude (specifically, the statute was likely referring to compulsory 
licensing of mechanical reproductions of music)103 and, further, that the 
owner of a published work had no common-law right to exclude.  At any 
rate, the contours of these rights are not closely examined by the Court, nor 
would it have been appropriate to do so, as the right to exclude was only 
mentioned to emphasize that a state tax would not affect the right one way 
or the other. 
Further, the only support the Court cites for the right to exclude is a 
patent case from 1908: Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag 
Co.104  Continental Paper Bag held, broadly, that unreasonable nonuse was 
not a qualifier of the ability of an inventor to exercise his right to exclude 
others from his invention during the patent term.105  Tracing the equitable 
remedy to patent infringement back to 1819, the Court explicitly rejected 
the argument that an inventor has a “sort of moral obligation” to make the 
invention available to the public as quickly as possible, noting that the 
monopoly was “only for a few years.”106  Driving the property argument 
home, the Court declared that “patents are property, and entitled to the 
same rights and sanctions as other property” and analogized patent 
infringement to a trespass.107  Finally, the Court reached no holding as to 
whether a future court, in view of the public interest, might withhold 
injunctive relief for such an infringement.108   
This case is wholly irrelevant to a modern copyright system.  Not only 
does the case fail to mention copyright once, even if it had it would have 
been citing a copyright act from 1870 (albeit with several more recent 
101. Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a)-(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075–76 (repealed 1976).
102. Id. § 2, 35 Stat. at 1076.
103. Id. § 1(e), 35 Stat. at 1075–76.
104. 210 U.S. 405, 422, 424 (1908).
105. Id. at 424, 428.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 425.
108. Id. at 430.
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amendments).109  With two complete overhauls of the system since then 
(along with numerous small-scale revisions), a 1908 patent case can hardly 
serve as proper precedent for such a squirrely interpretation of a copyright 
owner’s right to exclude.  Further, the breadth of the right to exclude 
granted to the patentee depended (and still depends), in the words of the 
Court, on public disclosure.110  Patentees are incentivized to publicly 
disclose via a patent rather than relying on trade secret protection, which 
would deny all public disclosure as long as the invention remained secret. 
No such dichotomy or incentive exists within copyright law.  Whereas 
common law copyright in unpublished works existed at the time of 
Continental Paper Bag and still existed under the Copyright Act of 1909, 
no such separate protection of unpublished works exists under modern 
copyright law; the law protects all eligible work equally, whether it is made 
available to the public or kept secret and unpublished.111  The analogy 
between the two systems, therefore, is strained and the disadvantages of 
public exclusion are not as justifiable where the need to incentivize public 
disclosure is absent. 
Finally, the age of Fox Film and the state of the law at the time it was 
decided is highly relevant.  The fact that Fox Film preceded the current 
Copyright Act does not, on its face, make the precedent obsolete; plenty of 
pre-1976 case law remains of vital importance to the current copyright 
scheme.112  But certain aspects of the law relating to the alienability of 
rights under the 1909 Act are treated very differently under the 1976 Act, 
making analogies to the modern day system more problematic.  First, 
authors under the 1909 Act were not free to sell their rights separately to 
one or more third parties, as they are today.113  Rather, an author at the time 
Fox Film was decided was obligated to either sell all of the exclusive rights 
granted by a copyright to a single third party or decline to sell any of them, 
making such a refusal one of only two options, and therefore a more 
109. Patent Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1909).
110. Id. at 424 (quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250).
111. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006) (“[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright, . . . whether published or 
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.”), with Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 2, 35 Stat. 
1075, 1076 (repealed 1976) (“[N]othing in this Act should be construed to annul or limit the right 
of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or equity, to prevent the 
copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent . . . .”). 
112. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (elucidating the idea-expression
distinction in copyright). 
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006).
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commonly exercised activity of a copyright owner at the time.114  An author 
could license rights individually;115 however, the licensee had no legal 
ability to enforce those rights against the world.116  The original author was 
still obligated to bring suit on behalf of the licensee if such rights were 
infringed.117  Such a system would have made a refusal to license the only 
palatable option for authors who preferred not to grant their entire 
copyrights away and who faced prospective user-distributors who insisted 
on a transfer of rights, rather than a license, in order to maintain the ability 
to file infringement suits on their own behalf.   
In addition, the term of copyright is much longer now than it was in 
1932.118  Rather than a term of twenty-eight or fifty-six years (depending 
on whether or not the author renewed), modern copyright protection 
subsists for the life of the author plus seventy years (raised from life-plus-
fifty years in 1998); under the modern system, even if an author creates a 
work and dies the same day, that copyright will still remain in force longer 
than the maximum length permissible at the time Fox Film was decided.119  
As the Court in Stewart explained: 
[A]lthough dissemination of creative works is a goal of the
Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the artist’s right
to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and
the public’s need for access to creative works.  The copyright term
114. See SAMUEL SPRING, RISKS AND RIGHTS 167 (1st ed. 1952) (“Any assignment of the
copyright is invalid unless all of the bundle of rights is transferred at one time . . . .  But an 
assignment of some of the rights included in the bundle . . . is invalid and unenforcible [sic], 
except as a license.”). 
115. See id.
116. See id. at 168.
117. See id. (“A licensee therefore can not [sic] sue an infringer in his own name for
infringements of rights he holds as licensee.  The licensor, i.e., the copyright proprietor, must sue 
for him.”). 
118. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1,
1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for 
a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death.”), with Act of 
1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (repealed 1976):  
([T]he copyright secured by this Act shall endure for twenty-eight years from 
the date of first publication . . . .  And provided further, That . . . the author of 
such work, if still living, or . . . his next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal and 
extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years 
when application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the 
copyright office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the 
expiration of the original term of copyright.). 
119. See supra note 118.
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is limited so that the public will not be permanently deprived of the 
fruits of an artist’s labors.120 
Although the Court was referring to the 1976 Act, rather than the 1909 
Act, the principle remains the same.  The House Report accompanying the 
1909 Act reads something similar: “In enacting a copyright law Congress 
must consider . . . two questions: First, how much will the legislation 
stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and second, how much 
will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?”121  The modern 
extension of the “limited times” in which a copyright subsists surely 
reframes the issue.  The advent of the Internet and digital distribution 
necessitates a similar reconsideration: once a work is “published” online, 
what effect would it have on the public to allow an author (or copyright 
owner) to exclude the public from accessing it?122 
Taken together, these factors lead to the conclusion that the Fox Film 
exclusory right doctrine does not withstand the test of time.  A new look at 
the exclusory right is needed. 
III. Reconsidering the Right to Exclude
A. Reframing the Issue
Tackling a problem as complex as the right to exclude can be
unwieldy, and certain avenues of analysis, while fruitful and important 
within the full scope of copyright law, will not be the focus of this 
particular article.  A brief mention of each may, however, be worthwhile 
for future scholarship.   
1. Free Expression and the First Amendment
The Supreme Court famously referred to copyright as the “engine of
free expression.”123  Courts have generally used the free expression 
rationale to justify imposing structured limits on fair use (to assure speakers 
that their expression will be protected).124  Commentators often take the 
opposite view, arguing that the First Amendment should justify tremendous 
120. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990).  For an extension of the “times have
changed” argument to Stewart as well, see infra Part IV.A.2. 
121. H.R. REP. 60-2222 at 7.
122. See Gervais, supra note 99, at 977–80.
123. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterps., 471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985).
124. See id.
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limitations on the right to exclude.125  There are a “veritable slew” of 
publications on copyright and the First Amendment,126 and this article will 
not add to them, but to mention that such analysis does not generally touch 
an author’s right to first publication, and that the First Amendment can 
usually be used to justify an author’s right to control his own speech (by 
excluding others from taking it) as equally as it justifies the public’s access 
to that speech.127 
2. Antitrust Law
The Supreme Court has recognized the Sherman Act as posing an
explicit limit on an author’s right to exclude.128  At the same time, antitrust 
law does not provide much of a cudgel against a copyright owner’s 
unilateral refusal to license; such a decision is presumptively valid under 
antitrust laws, and a spurned prospective licensee has the burden to prove 
anticompetitive practices, excluding an owner’s subjective motivation as 
evidence.129  Here, again, the ways in which antitrust law may or may not 
125. E.g., Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1169, 1173–74 (2007). 
126. John M. Newman, Note, Holden Caulfield Grows Up: Salinger v. Colting, the
Promotion-of-Progress Requirement, and Market Failure in a Derivative-Works Regime, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 737, 747 n.53 (2011) (collecting articles). 
127. Compare, e.g., Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 990 (2007) (arguing that permitting a copyright owner to suppress 
expression that conflicts with their view would harm general First Amendment interests), with 
Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 
1149–50 (2010) (“[T]he First Amendment protects [a copyright owner’s] right to develop and 
refine her own message prior to communicating it to the world as well as the right to decide 
against communicating it altogether.”).  It is coincidental but apt that the same academic author 
effectively used the First Amendment to argue both in favor of and against the right to exclude in 
respective articles. 
128. United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46–48 (1962).
129. See In re Indep. Svs. Orgs. Antitrust Lit. (hereinafter Xerox):
We therefore reject CSU’s invitation to examine Xerox's subjective motivation
in asserting its right to exclude under the copyright laws for pretext, in the
absence of any evidence that the copyrights were obtained by unlawful means
or were used to gain monopoly power beyond the statutory copyright granted
by Congress.)
203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support 
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[W]e hold that while exclusionary conduct 
can include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author's desire to 
exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business 
justification for any immediate harm to consumers.”).  But see:  
Nevertheless, although “nothing in the copyright statutes would prevent an 
author from hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright,” 
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cabin the right to exclude is worthy of a separate analysis that is beyond the 
scope of this article,130 other than to reiterate the point that unilateral 
refusals to deal are presumed valid under both copyright and antitrust 
law.131 
3. Publicity Law
Finally, while a publicity law analysis may be tempting, it is of little
use here.  Publicity and privacy law exist at common law only, and serve to 
fill in the gaps where copyright and trademark fail to provide protection.132  
In this case, no such gap exists; under the current copyright scheme and its 
lack of formalities, all creative works, even unpublished works, are 
protected by copyright by statute and so an assertion of an individual’s 
right to privacy would be superseded by whatever protection the Copyright 
Act provides.133  While a severe limitation on an author’s right to exclude 
might create a window for those same authors to make a privacy law 
argument, such a scenario is far beyond the purpose and scope of this 
article.134 
(emphasis added), the Copyright Act does not explicitly purport to limit the 
scope of the Sherman Act.  And, if the Copyright Act is silent on the subject 
generally, the silence is particularly acute in cases where a monopolist harms 
consumers in the monopolized market by refusing to license a copyrighted 
work to competitors. 
Id.  (internal citation omitted) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1990))). 
130. For a thorough examination of antitrust and refusals to deal in copyright along with a
robust criticism of Fox Film, see Catherine Parrish, Unilateral Refusals to License Software: 
Limitations on the Right to Exclude and the Need for Compulsory Licensing, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
557 (2002). 
131. See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1187.  Much scholarship already exists on the intersection
of antitrust law and unilateral refusals to deal in the patent context. See Parrish, supra note 130. 
See generally, e.g., Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and 
the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193 (2002) (arguing that imposing a 
general antitrust duty to deal on patentees could promote innovation in certain contexts). 
132. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.14 (2010) (“In
addition to these traditional forms of state law protection, the right to publicity represents a 
relatively new body of law having similarities to both copyright and trademark law . . . .  State 
protection of intangible property interests supplements federal protection and fills in gaps 
unattended by federal law.”). 
133. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012).
134. For a brief discussion of the interplay between publicity law and the now-defunct
(practically speaking) common law copyright doctrine, see Jeffrey Malkan, Stolen Photographs: 
Personality, Publicity, and Privacy, 75 TEX. L. REV. 779, 798 (1997). 
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B. Defining the Discussion: Considering the Unilateral Refusal to License
The final step before moving into full analysis of the right to exclude is
to differentiate between exercising a unilateral right to exclude against a 
discrete potential user and exercising a blanket right to exclude against the 
world (that is, the right to hoard).  The former is not only a presumptively 
valid exercise of a copyright owner’s exclusory power,135 it is also the core 
notion of the incentive that copyright law provides: the ability to exclude 
others and therefore extract more value from the publication of the work 
itself.136  Challenges to the right to exclude are almost universally decided 
in favor of the intellectual property owner.137  Perhaps part of the reason for 
this phenomenon is that nearly any discrete instance of a refusal to license 
is part of a valid exercise of statutory power.138  Without that power, a 
copyright owner has little chance to mine the maximum value from his 
work.  Part of what a movie producer or book publisher bargains for is 
exclusivity; if an author cannot provide such a guarantee, his creative 
product is worth little to any individual distributor.139  Before simply 
accepting the right to exclude unilaterally as desirable, however, 
considering the basic alternative scheme of copyright protection (one based 
on nonexclusive compulsory licenses with no exclusory right) is a 
worthwhile exercise. 
The alternative to this dominant free-market, maximum-control view is 
that by providing unlimited public access to a creative work for a 
statutorily determined fee, an author can receive financial remuneration for 
their work (thereby encouraging future creation) while at the same time 
providing maximum “progress” of creative works by spreading access to 
135. See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1187.
136. See, e.g., Max Stul Oppenheimer, The Time and Place for “Technology-Shifting”
Rights, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 269, 273 (2010) (“The ‘exclusive’ rights that the 
Constitution authorizes Congress to grant are exclusive in the sense of ‘rights to exclude’ rather 
than ‘all-inclusive rights.’”); Ryan J. Swingle, Note, Tasini v. New York Times: The Problem of 
Unauthorized Secondary Usage of an Author’s Works, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 601, 622 (1998) 
(“The copyright law . . . should have been interpreted by the court as preserving the remaining 
rights . . . in the plaintiffs, so that the plaintiffs would have the requisite bargaining power to sell 
those rights and receive a fair return for the work.”). 
137. Cf. Data General, 36 F.3d at 1187 (creating a high barrier to establish anticompetitive
conduct in any discrete refusal to deal in the patent context). 
138. Cf. id.
139. See Nicolas Suzor, Access, Progress, and Fairness: Rethinking Exclusivity in Copyright,
15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 297, 309 (2013) (“Exclusivity allows a commodity market in 
expression, and the market provides an objective method of valuing creative works.  In this 
context, abundance models that use purely economic arguments to decouple incentives from 
exclusivity in copyright fail because they break the link between incentives and reward.”). 
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those works to the most people.140  This conceptualization fails for two 
reasons, however.  First, it is entirely impractical; such a shift to completely 
alter the monopolistic nature of copyright law would require a complete 
overhaul of the Copyright Act as currently written (and any copyright 
scheme existing anywhere in the world) and is extremely unlikely to ever 
gain traction.  Second, the actual implementation of such a scheme would 
require a statutorily determined royalty rate for any given work: essentially 
a compulsory license.  While there is precedence for such a scheme—a 
triad of royalty judges already determine the statutory rate for mechanical 
reproduction licenses in music141—such an arrangement would harm all 
parties in the aggregate.   
There are three players in the scheme whose benefits and losses 
determine the ultimate utility of any given copyright scheme: individual 
creators, creative content distributors (e.g., producers and publishers), and 
the public at large.  There are also two types of individual creators: those 
with bargaining power (the “famous artists”) and those without (the 
“starving artists”).  Those without bargaining power—the starving artists 
who are at risk of signing unremunerative transfers of rights and who were 
the targets of the old renewal-rights scheme and the current termination-
rights scheme142—are in no position to negotiate terms under the current 
system.143  They usually sign away all control over their rights for a 
standard minimum agreement.144  A statutory royalty in a given field that is 
140. See Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United State Constitution, or Introducing the Progress 
Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 809 (2001) (“The word ‘progress’ means ‘spread.’”). 
141. 17 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2012). See generally COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD,
http://www.loc.gov/crb (last visited Apr. 1, 2013); see also Shane D. Valenzi, Note, A Rollicking 
Band of Pirates: Licensing the Exclusive Right of Public Performance in the Theatre Industry, 14 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 759, 790–91 (2012). 
142. See Shane Valenzi, It’s Only a Day Away: Rethinking Copyright Termination in a New
Era, 53 IDEA 225, 227, 236–37 (2013); see also Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172–
73 (1985) (“[T]he termination right was expressly intended to relieve authors of the consequences 
of ill-advised and unremunerative grants that had been made before the author had a fair 
opportunity to appreciate the true value of his work product.”  (citing H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 127 
(1976))). 
143. See John M. Kernochan, The Distribution Right in the United States of America: Review
and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1433 (1989) (“In the United States, upon sale, there is a 
consequent and sometimes serious loss of artistic and economic control over the future of the 
work, especially if weak bargaining power means the artist must yield the copyright . . . .”). 
144. See Don E. Tomlinson, Everything that Glitters Is Not Gold: Songwriter-Music
Publisher Agreements and Disagreements, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 85, 94 (1995) 
(“Because of the impossibility of predicting the commercial value of a work upon its creation and 
because of the weak bargaining position of [songwriters], they sometimes assigned their 
copyrights in return for very little remuneration, such as small lump-sum payments or inadequate 
royalty rates . . . .”). 
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equal to the current minimum agreement artists sign in that field, and that 
would guarantee the public’s ability to sign nonexclusive licenses to use the 
work, would not place those artists in any better or worse of a financial 
situation than they are currently in.  Additionally, both systems prevent 
those authors from exercising any control over their work.  Distributors in 
each field would be in a worse position under the nonexclusive compulsory 
license system, because they would pay the same amount (the minimum) 
but for less control, as anyone could license the same right to the same 
work.  Notably, however, artists with no bargaining power also have no 
current market for their work, so any refusal to license is not likely to 
inflict any harm on the public except in the abstract (by depriving the 
public of part of the universe of creative expression). 
On the other hand, those artists with bargaining power (i.e., the 
successful, famous ones) would be severely harmed by such a scheme. 
First, the agreements these artists sign are much higher than the minimum 
agreements.145  A statutory rate equal to the minimum would deprive those 
artists with the largest market for their works of both the revenue and the 
control they’ve bargained for through market forces.146  A statutory rate 
that is any lower than the maximum a famous artist could earn would 
incentivize third-party facilitators to license work from more popular artists 
who would have, under the current free-market system, been able to 
bargain for a higher rate.  A statutory rate at the same level or higher than 
the current market-determined minimum would, conversely, incentivize 
licensing of famous authors’ work at the expense of the “starving artists” 
who would have otherwise agreed to a lower rate.  As a result, everyone 
loses: the established artists lose revenue, facilitators and artists lose all 
control, emerging artists lose the opportunity to be discovered (because 
licensing their work is no cheaper than licensing work from already 
established creators), and the public loses in the aggregate because such 
increased barriers to entry and decreased bargaining potential would 
discourage new artists from beginning creation and established artists from 
continuing to create. 
This brief consideration of an alternative scheme reveals that protecting 
the unilateral right to exclude in turn protects the continued production of 
145. See id. at 87–92 (describing differences between the bargaining power of successful
songwriters and newly-signed songwriters when negotiating with producers, and noting that 
successful songwriters often become their own publishers when they are able). 
146. Of course, every author begins with full control.  But few authors are able to monetize
their work without transferring their rights to a distributor (at least historically), and only 
successful authors are able to maintain control either through self-distribution or through greater 
bargaining power with distributors. 
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creative works.  Picking and choosing who may use a given creative work 
makes economic sense for the creators, and the interests of the creators, 
distributors, and the public should theoretically be aligned to provide as 
much access to creative work to the public (and therefore generate as much 
profit) as possible.147  This careful economic structure breaks down 
entirely, however, when either a creator or a distributor’s interests change; 
i.e., when one who controls access to a creative work denies all access to
the world, not just to discrete individuals seeking a license on unacceptable
terms.
Accepting, then, the notion that some level of control over unilateral 
licensing agreements is a desirable scheme, this article will turn its 
exclusive attention to an author’s right to refuse to transfer or license their 
work to anyone—that is, the right to hoard. 
C. Property Rights and the Right to Hoard148
Is copyright property?  The Supreme Court has asserted on multiple
occasions that it is.149  At the same time, the Court has noted that copyright 
is a statutory right conferred by Congress and not a natural right.150  John 
147. The debate centers on the amount the public should pay, which is beyond the scope of
this article. 
148. Under now-defunct common law copyright, the author of an unpublished work retained
the right of first publication regardless of other statutory rights surrounding it; now that statutory 
copyright subsists in a work from the moment of creation, however, there is no functional 
difference in the bundle of rights between published and unpublished works.  See supra note 111. 
The only creative field in which an unpublished author retains slightly more control over their 
work than a published author is music, where a published work is subject to compulsory 
mechanical reproductions (i.e., recorded covers of the song).  See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010).  For 
the purposes of this section, then, both published and unpublished works may be analyzed 
together. 
149. See, e.g., C.I.R. v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 401 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(“In the exercise of its power ‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ Congress, by 
granting copyrights, has created valuable property rights.”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 
123, 128 (1932); see also Loew’s Inc. v. CBS, 131 F. Supp. 165, 184 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (“After all, 
copyright is property . . . .”).  See generally Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete 
Historiographies: of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 
1004–46 (2006) (presenting an informal historiographal survey of references to pre-20th century 
copyright law, and concluding that copyright was commonly understood internationally by 
courts, legislatures, and academics to be a form of property).  But see generally Tom W. Bell, 
Copyright as Intellectual Property Privilege, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 523 (2008) (arguing 
copyright is better conceptualized as a form of legislatively granted privilege, not property). 
150. E.g., Sony v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 n.10 (1984) (“In its report
accompanying the comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act in 1909, the Judiciary Committee 
of the House of Representatives explained this balance:  ‘The enactment of copyright legislation 
by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the 
author has in his writings . . . .’”  (citing H. R. REP. NO.  60-2222, at 7 (1909))). 
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Locke describes the right to property as a natural and fundamental right,151 
which seems to place the judicial interpretation of copyright as a property 
right at odds with the Congressional view of copyright as a government 
grant to individuals for the benefit of society.152  A closer look at the full 
scope of Locke’s property theory reveals a common space (literally) within 
which to bridge the two conceptions. 
Many copyright scholars are familiar with the labor-theory aspect of 
Locke’s proviso: a property owner holds the moral right to exclude 
everyone from his property due to the labor he put into cultivating that 
property.153  The Lockean labor theory of copyright suggests that an author 
deserves protection based on the effort he put into the work, which closely 
aligns with the moral rights justification for copyright prominent in 
Europe.154  If an apple grows on a property owner’s land and the owner 
picks it, the theory goes, then that owner should have the right to exclude 
anyone else from entering his land and taking his apple.155   
This principle alone is an oversimplification of the theory, however. 
First, such a principle presumes that equivalent apples are available for 
151. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 25 (1890) (“[M]en . . . have a
property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common . . . .”); id. § 27 
(“[E]very man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself . . . . 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath 
mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property.”). 
152. Compare id., with Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) (“Recent
cases in this court have affirmed the proposition that  copyright property under the Federal law is 
wholly statutory, and depends upon the right created under the acts of Congress passed in 
pursuance of the authority conferred under article 1, § 8, of the Federal Constitution . . . .”), and 
H. R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (“The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under 
the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings 
. . . .”). 
153. Locke states how:
(The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly
his.  Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided,
and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is
his own, and thereby makes it his property.  It being by him removed from the
common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something
annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour
being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a
right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good,
left in common for others.
LOCKE, supra note 151, § 27. 
154. Id.
155. Id.
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picking elsewhere.156  Second, the principle also contemplates that there 
exists a separate tract of land—the “commons”—which all may use and 
which none may restrict.157  Finally, and most importantly, the principle 
requires the laborer to do something with the apple.  A land owner may not 
exercise his right to exclude others from his fruit while he allows it to rot 
on the tree.158  While labor and moral rights theorists have traditionally 
156. Id. § 33:
Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any
prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and
more than the yet unprovided could use.  So that, in effect, there was never the
less left for others because of his inclosure for himself: for he that leaves as
much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all.
157. See id. § 27 (“[N]o man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least
where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.”). 
158. The relevant provision reads:
As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils,
so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is
more than his share, and belongs to others.  Nothing was made by God for man
to spoil or destroy.  And thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there
was a long time in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of
that provision the industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to the
prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of
what might serve for his use; there could be then little room for quarrels or
contentions about property so established.
Id. § 31.  
A similar sentiment is expressed in id. §§ 37–38: 
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, 
killed, caught or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he that so impoyed 
his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature, as any way to alter 
them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of his labour on 
them, did thereby acquire a property in them: but if they perished, in his 
possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, 
before he could spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and 
was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour’s share for he had no right, 
farther than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him 
conveniences of life. 
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, 
killed, caught or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he that so impoyed 
his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature, as any way to alter 
them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of his labour on 
them, did thereby acquire a property in them: but if they perished, in his 
possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, 
before he could spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and 
was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour’s share for he had no right, 
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used Lockean labor theory to justify an author’s sacred and fundamental 
right to exclude others from their work, such a right is cabined by an 
obligation to use it in some way.   
Under Lockean theory, then, the right to hoard does not exist.  As long 
as an author uses a work in some way, by providing some sort of public 
access, that author is free to exclude all others.  To create but not use is 
tantamount to allowing your carefully cultivated creative apples to rot 
while excluding the starving public.159  In addition, executing a broad right 
to exclude depends on a robust commons by which the public may craft its 
own similar work.  In copyright terms, this “commons” consists not only of 
public domain works, but also material that is not copyrightable (e.g., 
ideas, words).  This creative commons160 made up of works currently in the 
public domain as well as ideas and other uncopyrightable material 
presumes that a future user is also a creator.  This storehouse of knowledge 
does not deplete, and copyright law does not threaten it (or, at least, it 
should not).  Such a conception may justify a copyright owner’s blanket 
refusal to license derivative works; with a broad storehouse of ideas from 
which to draw, there is no reason a future creator cannot rely on an idea 
rather than an earlier creator’s protected expression in order to create.  But 
most users are just that: users, not creators.  They want to consume, not 
create, and leaving these users only public domain expression to consume 
is inapposite to the goals of copyright under any statutory scheme, 
particularly where nothing new (when properly renewed) has entered the 
public domain since 1923 (and likely won’t anytime soon).161 
farther than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him 
conveniences of life. 
But if either the grass of his inclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his 
planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth, 
notwithstanding his inclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be 
the possession of any other. 
See also id. § 48. 
159. See supra note 158.
160. Not to be confused with the Creative Commons, the collection of free copyrighted
material available online for use with various non-onerous license restrictions.  See About, 
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).  Unlike the 
real-world Creative Commons project, the Lockean creative commons does not consist of 
copyrighted material available for free, but rather consists only of uncopyrightable creative 
content. 
161. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 214 (2004) (“Eldred would not be free to add
any works more recent than 1923 to his collection until 2019.  Indeed, no copyrighted work 
would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress extends the term 
again).  By contrast, in the same period, more than 1 million patents will pass into the public 
domain.”). 
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Under this property-rights analysis, the type of right being hoarded is 
relevant.162  An argument against hoarding is very strong when applied to 
the distribution right,163 as that right most directly affects public access to 
the work for consumptive purposes and is the most obvious analogy to the 
work “rotting on the tree.”  In contrast, this analysis does not cut strongly 
against an author’s (or copyright owner’s) right to refuse to license the 
derivative right to his work in any form164—with only an uncopyrightable 
idea necessary to spur authorship of a creative work, the argument that 
copyrightable expression must also be made available for alteration is 
nearly nonexistent.165  In Lockean terms, there is no need to compel access 
to privately owned apples when there are perfectly good pears in the 
commons. 
Protecting an author’s derivative right also protects a literary author’s 
right to “version” his work—that is, to option a book into a movie. 
Compelling an author to license a work to any film company that comes 
calling could actually harm the value of the work.  As an example, films 
based on the works of Stephen King run the gamut of quality.  He has 
licensed faithful film adaptations that were critically acclaimed (e.g., The 
Shawshank Redemption, The Green Mile), adaptations that flopped (e.g., 
Dreamcatcher, Hearts in Atlantis), and television miniseries that, while 
faithful, have not aged well over time (It, The Stand).166  King has also 
licensed comic books, video games, and even pop-up books derived from 
his works.167  He has not always been happy with the final result,168 but 
162. The discussion infra refers to the exclusive rights embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 106
(reproduction, distribution, public display, public performance, and derivative), commonly 
understood as the “bundle of rights” that comprise a copyright.  It does not, for example, refer to 
the statutory termination right contained in §§ 203 and 304.  “Hoarding,” the termination right, is, 
in this author’s view, inevitable, since the right itself was intended to be inalienable.  See Valenzi, 
supra note 142, at 225. 
163. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
right[] . . . to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending[.]”). 
164. Id. § 106(2) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive right[] . . . to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work[.]”). 
165. See generally Daniel J. Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects
Foxes Better Than Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785, 798–99 (2013) (examining the 
derivative right’s “different normative target” from the reproduction right, and citing Jessica 
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966 (1990) (“[T]he very act of authorship in 
any medium is more akin to translation and recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from 
the foam of the sea.”)). 
166. For a comprehensive list of King’s works and the authorized versioning of each one, see
Creator:StephenKing, TV, TROPES, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/ Creator/StephenKing 
?from =Main.StephenKing (last visited May 1, 2013). 
167. Id.
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making decisions about which adaptations to license (a film version of The 
Dark Tower series has yet to take form, for example) and the form such 
adaptations should take (King often prefers television miniseries, 
presumably because they can capture more of the source material and he 
can maintain more creative control) should remain purely the province of 
the author.   
Even an author who refuses to license any derivative use of any of his 
works may have normative grounds to do so. J. D. Salinger, who took just 
such a stance during his lifetime, perhaps expressed this sentiment best 
through a private letter denying a prospective filmmaker the rights to adapt 
his work: “I see my novel as a novel and only a novel.”169  To put it in 
Lockean terms, the creative work is the author’s absolute property. 
Provided he has made productive use of it (by releasing it to the public as a 
novel), he has fulfilled whatever duty to the public he may have and should 
not be required to sacrifice any more of his creative control.  Just because 
an owner is content to eat his apples raw does not mean he is obligated to 
allow an outsider to turn his product into apple pie. 
The importance of hoarding the remaining exclusive rights depends 
very much on the work in question.  Hoarding the right of reproduction170 
in a great work of art seems perfectly appropriate; less so for a great work 
of literature.  In contrast, hoarding the right to display171 that same work of 
art would prevent the public from accessing the work in any meaningful 
way.  Hoarding of the display right in musical or dramatic works, however, 
might hurt certain types of advertising but wouldn’t prevent access to the 
heart of those works themselves.  Of course, preventing all public 
performance172 of those later two categories of works would eviscerate the 
creative contributions those works make to the public.   
168. For example, King remade The Shining after he was famously displeased with Stanley
Kubrick’s loose adaptation.  See id.  King also attempted to have his name legally removed from 
the film Lawnmower Man, which bore no resemblance to his short story and licensed the work 
purely for name recognition.  See id. 
169. See Judy Berman, Letter: J.D. Salinger Rejects Film Adaptation of “Catcher in the
Rye,” FLAVORWIRE (Dec. 6, 2010, 1:01 PM), http://flavorwire.com/134595/letter-j-d-salinger-
rejects-film-adaptation-of-catcher-in-the-rye. 
170. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
right[] . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords[.]”). 
171. Id. § 106(5) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive right[] . . . in
the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly[.]”). 
172. Id. § 106(4) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive right[] . . . in
the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly[.]”). 
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In sum, a proper Lockean analysis of property rights protects a discrete 
right to exclude only so far as a copyright owner makes some affirmative 
use of his rights to the work.  Under Lockean theory, an author may still 
refuse to make or license a derivative of his work, but hoarding any of the 
remaining exclusive rights without exercising them frustrates public access 
to some category of protectable work.  
As a final addendum, an astute reader may note that, by treating 
published and unpublished works together under this analysis, many types 
of unpublished work would be inappropriately subject to public access 
(diaries, confidential documents, or even simply unfinished drafts of 
creative work).  Although technically protected by copyright, proponents of 
the continued secrecy of these works should, practically speaking, not be 
concerned about the effects of this theory on unpublished works.  First, in 
the case of unfinished drafts, the Lockean theory supports an author’s right 
to tend his own garden; until a work is completed, its creator would be 
unable to “waste” its creation, so no public access would be required.  In 
the case of completed-but-private works, such as diaries and private papers, 
copyright law alone simply shouldn’t rule the day.173  Here, a privacy law 
analysis should come back into play, as permitting public access to these 
sorts of works would be damaging to a person’s “right to be let alone” in a 
way that copyright law was not and should not be designed to 
accommodate.174  Much as trademark scholars have argued that trademark 
law need not concern itself with evils fought by unfair competition or false 
advertising laws, copyright law and theory in this case need not concern 
itself with privacy issues protectable under the common law.175 
173. The very foundations of copyright law draw a meaningful distinction between published
and unpublished works.  See generally M. ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF 
COPYRIGHT 79 (1993). 
174. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193–96 (1890). 
175. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413,
427 (2010): 
We therefore propose to do away with the “sponsorship or affiliation” 
terminology altogether and to reframe the trademark infringement question in 
terms of whether the defendant's use is likely to confuse consumers about who 
is responsible for the quality of the defendant's goods or services.  Uses that 
cause such confusion should be deemed trademark infringement; those that 
cause confusion regarding other types of relationships should be dealt with, if 
at all, through something analogous to a false advertising claim. 
Id. 
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D. Reconciling the Property View with the Utilitarian View
One problem with a robust property-rights analysis of the right to
exclude is that the Lockean labor theory of copyright has little domestic 
influence.  The United States has long rejected such an approach in favor of 
a purely utilitarian (i.e., economic) justification.  In fact, the Fox Film 
Court alludes to exactly that distinction when it notes that copyright law 
rewards the “labors of authors” only to benefit the public, and not for the 
authors’ own sake.176  But even in purely utilitarian terms, the right to 
hoard sits on shaky ground. 
The right to hoard is wholly incompatible with the utilitarian view of 
copyright.  The utilitarian system of copyright is based on the effective 
workings of the free market.177  Adopting Samuel Johnson’s quip that “[n]o 
man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money,”178 as a mantra, the 
theory predicates awarding authors the right to exclude on the notion that 
authors can maximize the economic value of their works through 
bargaining.179  As detailed above, removing an author’s ability to exclude 
anyone from using his work as they please would decrease the economic 
potential of the work, and thereby decrease an author’s incentive to 
create.180  This purely economic system is equally a utilitarian system 
because incentivizing creation is done solely for the good of the public—to 
guarantee public access to creative works.181  Though exercising the right 
to exclude necessarily limits the public availability of some works, the 
theory goes, such protection extends only for a limited time, and the public 
will gain in the aggregate because every work will ultimately enter the 
public domain.182   
176. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
177. Cf. Alina Ng, The Author’s Rights in Literary and Artistic Works, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 453 (2010) (“Congress protects these specific acts of publicly 
disseminating works to facilitate market commercialization of creative works by preventing the 
general public from exercising the exclusive rights under section 106 without the permission of 
the author or copyright owner.”). 
178. JAMES BOSWELL, 2 BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 14 (Henry Frowde ed., Oxford 1904)
(quoting Samuel Johnson). 
179. See Ng, supra note 177, at 462 (“Economic theory seeks to encourage authorship by the
promise of market rewards, and through the market, authors are remunerated for their 
creativity.”). 
180. See id. at 490–91
181. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 60-2222 (1909) (“Not primarily for the benefit of the author,
but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are given.”). 
182. See, e.g., Rebekah O’Hara, You Say You Want a Revolution: Music & Technology—
Evolution or Destruction?, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 247, 258 (2004) (“The quid pro quo for a ‘Limited 
Times’ monopoly is the ability of the public to access the materials after the copyright expires 
and falls into the public domain.”). 
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Whether copyright is treated as a privilege or a property right,183 an 
author who hoards a work and refuses to release it to the public takes away 
more “good” from society than it provides: the public loses access to the 
work (bad), a monopoly exists (bad), and the author earns no economic 
benefit, and thereby has no incentive to further create (neutral).184  The 
right to hoard, then, can only be justified with a view towards the public in 
the long term—that is, while the present public may not benefit, the future 
public will benefit because the work will enter the public domain at some 
point.185  Such a justification is commonly asserted in patent cases.186  It is 
here that the similar theories and justifications of copyright and patent law 
diverge, however, due to the practical differences between the laws.  Patent 
monopolies expire after twenty years.187  With some fancy tricks, an 
inventor may extend that monopoly by a year.188  Therefore, when the 
Court notes at the turn of the twentieth century that “the monopoly which 
he receives is only for a few years,” such a sentiment remains relevant 
183. See generally Bell, supra note 149 (arguing that copyright’s property-like attributes are
all qualified, and therefore can be better conceptualized as a set of privileges). 
184. The system is designed to trade off the creation of monopoly power (bad) with public
access (good) and additional incentive to create (good).  While few would argue in modern 
economic terms that an author only creates for the potential to make money, scratching a creative 
itch and self-actualizing through creation are not contemplated under the cold economic terms on 
which U.S. copyright law is predicated.  See, e.g., H. REP. 60-2222 at 7 (1909) stating: 
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the 
Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his 
writings, for the Supreme Court has held that such rights as he has are purely 
statutory rights, but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be 
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to 
authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings . . . .  Not 
primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the 
public such rights are given. 
Id. 
185. See O’Hara, supra note 182, at 258.
186. E.g., In re Metoprolol Succinate Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 2010 WL
1485328, at *1 (D. Del. April 13, 2010) (“The Hatch–Waxman Amendments intend to balance 
two important public policy objectives: (1) prescription drug manufacturers need meaningful 
market protection incentives to encourage the development of new drugs; and (2) once the 
statutory  patent protection and marketing exclusivity for these new drugs has expired, the public 
benefits from the rapid availability of lower priced generic versions of the innovator drug.”). 
187. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
188. SEAN B. SEYMORE, SEYMORE ON PROVISIONAL PATENT APPLICATIONS 1 n.55 (2012) 
(“By waiting the full year to file the nonprovisional application, applicants may effectively extend 
their patent term to 21 years.”) (on file with author). 
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today even though the patent term is longer than it was when the Court first 
asserted the justification.189   
In contrast, nothing currently protected by copyright will enter the 
public domain any time soon.190  Lobbying interests in copyrighted work 
are too strong, and the advocates of the public domain too poor to wage a 
successful fight against continued extensions of the copyright term which 
is, after all, not based on any natural right of the public to access creative 
work.191  As the promise of the public domain is pushed further to the 
future, the present public utility decreases; the longer the term of 
protection, the less good is created in the present.192  Like money, access to 
a creative work today is worth more than access to a creative work 
tomorrow.193  
Really, then, there is no economic justification to allow an author to 
hoard his works during the term of copyright.  That is not to say that the 
right to hoard is an unreasonable extreme in copyright law generally. 
Indeed, the French droit de repentir is essentially a codified right to hoard 
189. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908).
190. See LESSIG, supra note 161.
191. Justice Breyer’s dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242 (2003) (Breyer J.,
dissenting), contained a compelling list of quotes from the legislative history of the Copyright 
Term Extension Act suggesting that the notion of perpetual copyright had strong Congressional 
and lobbying support as of 1998: 
[T]he statute was named after a Member of Congress who, the legislative
history records, “wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever.” 144
Cong. Rec. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono).
See also Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation:
Hearings on H.R. 989 et al. before the Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.,
94 (1995) (hereinafter House Hearings) (statement of Rep. Sonny Bono)
(questioning why copyrights should ever expire); ibid. (statement of Rep.
Berman) (“I guess we could ... just make a permanent moratorium on the
expiration of copyrights”); id., at 230 (statement of Rep. Hoke) (“Why 70
years? Why not forever? Why not 150 years?”); cf. ibid. (statement of the
Register of Copyrights) (In Copyright Office proceedings, “[t]he Songwriters
Guild suggested a perpetual term”); id., at 234 (statement of Quincy Jones)
(“I'm particularly fascinated with Representative Hoke's statement.... [W]hy 
not forever?”); id., at 277 (statement of Quincy Jones) (“If we can start with 
70, add 20, it would be a good start”). 
Id. at 256. 
192. See id. at 254–55 (Breyer J., dissenting) (“Using assumptions about the time value of
money provided us by a group of economists (including five Nobel prize winners), it seems fair 
to say that, for example, a 1% likelihood of earning $100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years 
into the future, is worth less than seven cents today.”). 
193. Id.
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published works, granting an author the right to modify or even withdraw 
his work from publication through the transferee.194  This right envisions 
publication as a continual process. At the point where a work requires some 
sort of modification to accurately express an author’s current frame of 
mind, or the author wishes to remove it from public consumption entirely, 
the author simply withdraws permission and the distributor must similarly 
withdraw the work.195  This article’s objection to the right to hoard is not 
based on its infeasibility in any copyright system; rather, the French droit 
de repentir is strong evidence that the right to hoard is a moral one.  Its 
normative bearings presume a work as an extension of an author’s 
personality, and attach authorial control and the right to exclude not to a 
property theory (and certainly not to an economic justification), but rather 
to the idea that artistic works are personal works and should be protected as 
a form of bodily integrity and personal autonomy.196  Moral rights and 
personality theory are entirely absent in U.S. copyright law, and it is the 
sole reliance on economic justification to the explicit exclusion of 
personality theories that prevents the right to hoard from gaining any 
foundational traction in U.S. copyright law. 
Even though Lockean theory similarly does not comport with 
utilitarian theory in U.S. copyright law, here they share similar ideals. 
Both are interested in a robust public domain.  Neither wishes to see 
creative work rot on the vine.  Both believe in promoting the welfare of the 
individual creator contingent on the impact such promotion has on the 
public.  Utilitarianism would protect the welfare of the individual only so 
far as the well-being of the public increases just as much or more, while 
Lockean theory would protect the welfare of the individual so long as such 
protection does not harm another, including through the misuse of 
resources.  While these two theories are often incompatible on issues such 
as control of a work and term of protection, they both should, in theory, 
soundly reject the right of an author to prevent all use of a copyrighted 
work during its term of protection. 
194. C. civ. art. 543, Code pénal [C. pén] art. 32 (Law of March 11, 1957 on literary and
artistic property). 
195. See Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the
Protection of Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 23–25 (1988). 
196. See generally id.  Though personality theory in copyright is traditionally categorized as
Hegelian, a handful of prominent German twentieth century philosophers, Karl Gareis and Otto 
Friedrich von Gierke, parsed and popularized the personality theory of artistic and literary works 
independent of Hegelian influence.  See id. at 27–28. 
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E. Counterpoint: A Hohfeldian Analysis
The principal difficulty facing opponents of the right to hoard is the
aggregate nature of the right.  A Hohfeldian view of copyright highlights 
this problem.  Hohfeld separates the traditionally vague legal use of “right” 
into eight distinct concepts: a right (and its opposite no-right), a privilege 
(and its opposite duty), a power (and its opposite disability) and an 
immunity (and its opposite liability).197  Hohfeld goes on to separate rights 
into paucital rights—rights asserted against an individual—and “multital” 
rights—rights asserted against a large group in the aggregate.198  In parsing 
this distinction, Hohfield posits that multital rights are, in effect, simply a 
collection of paucital rights. Rather than a single right held against a group, 
a multital right is actually an accumulation of separate paucital rights 
owned by the author against each individual in the group.199  Hohfield’s 
support for this hypothesis is grounded in practicality; he quotes Professor 
Samuel Williston, who notes, “Though legal ownership is conceived 
fundamentally as a right good against all the world, actual instances of such 
ownership are often much more narrowly limited.”200 
This construction provides the strongest support for the right to hoard. 
As an initial matter, a copyright embodies aspects of all of these 
classifications (a right to exclude others, the privilege to use, the power to 
license and sell, and the immunity from having the copyright taken away 
except under certain circumstances).  The objection to the right to hoard, as 
established in this article, centers only on a blanket right asserted against 
the world (a multital right, to use the Hohfeldian term), not any individual 
refusal to license (which, after all, is already presumptively valid).  By 
challenging the nature of the multital right to a collection of discrete 
paucital rights, which are each presumptively valid, the right to hoard is an 
illogical but justifiable result of a series of legitimate rights not enforced 
against the world, but rather enforced against each discrete member. 
197. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1913) (exploring and defining the terms “right,” 
“privilege,” “power,” and “immunity” in detail). 
198. See, supra note 197,  at 718–20.
199. See id. at 742 (“[I]t is submitted that instead of there being a single right with a single
correlative duty resting on all the persons against whom the right avails, there are many separate 
and distinct rights, actual and potential, each one of which has a correlative duty resting upon 
some one person.”). 
200. Id. at 742 (citing Samuel Williston, Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action
Legal or Equitable?, 30 HARV. L. REV. 97, 98 (1916)). 
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Parsing through this quandary is a challenge.  Logically, Hohfeldian 
analysis justifies a blanket right to hoard.201  Practically, Hohfeld’s 1917 
analysis evinces a Lochner-era classical, legal liberal view of rights and 
privileges, and his arguments are littered with strong individual and 
property rights arguments that are not wholly compatible with modern legal 
interactions.202  For example, fair use and other statutory exemptions 
already provide exceptions to the pure rights classification, which prevent a 
perfect symmetry between Hohfeld’s correlative legal concepts and the 
realities of copyright law. 
More importantly, Hohfeld is wholly silent on the implications of a 
scenario in which a multital right is legally impermissible while the 
paucital rights making up the multital rights are not so limited.  While 
supporters of the right to hoard may draw the conclusion that such a 
multital right cannot be declared impermissible under this 
conceptualization, this conclusion is a conjecture, nothing more.  Hohfeld’s 
work was not intended to make policy arguments; he was merely interested 
in defining a consistent vocabulary for judges, law students, and scholars to 
discuss legal issues.  Under this interpretation, Hohfeldian analysis is 
useful in that it provides clear, consistent definitions of “right” and 
“privilege,” but it is intentionally inconclusive on the normative values 
regarding the right to hoard.  
IV. Implementing a Solution
A. Preventing the Right to Hoard in the United States
Copyright law does not normatively support an author’s right to hoard.
Preventing that sort of behavior under the current U.S. copyright system, 
however, is more problematic.  Congress isn’t likely to amend the 
Copyright Act anytime soon, and when they do it certainly won’t be to 
201. In fact, Hohfeld suggests as much in the field of real property, in contravention of
Locke’s use requirement: 
Even though the land be entirely vacant and A have no intention whatever of 
personally using the land, his rights or claims that others shall not use it even 
temporarily in such ways as would not alter its physical character are, 
generally, of great economic significance as tending to make others 
compensate A in exchange for the extinguishment of his rights, or claims, or in 
other words, the creation of privileges of user and enjoyment. 
Id. at 747. 
202. See id.
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remove rights from authors.203  Rather, protecting public access from 
hoarding by authors can most easily be effected by the courts through 
careful application of the eBay standard for issuing judicial relief following 
a finding of infringement.  Such judicial decision-making, however, will 
require careful handling of Stewart v. Abend and its strong language 
permitting an author the unlimited right to exclude.   
1. Using eBay
eBay v. MercExchange established a mode of analysis for determining
when to issue injunctions as relief in patent infringement cases.204  Its four-
step test has since been applied to copyright and trademark infringement as 
well.205  Rather than imposing injunctions at every instance of 
infringement, eBay mandates a case-by-case analysis, issuing an injunction 
only if: (1) the injury from infringement is irreparable; (2) remedies 
available at law (that is, monetary damages) are inadequate to compensate 
for the injury; (3) considering the balance of hardship between the infringer 
and the rightful owner, an injunction is warranted; and, (4) the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.206  In setting 
these factors, the Supreme Court moved away from the traditional practice 
of issuing injunctions in nearly every instance of patent infringement.207  
The decision has since been used to justify a court’s refusal to issue an 
injunction against an infringer and instead award monetary damages equal 
to what a fairly priced license for the patent would have been, effectively 
awarding a compulsory license to the infringer.208 
203. See generally Jessica Litman, The Copyright Revision Act of 2026, 13 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 249, 255–57 (2009): 
Instead of setting out the scope of individual audience interests in explicit 
terms, the basic architecture of the system respected the rights of readers, 
listeners, and viewers by limiting the reach of copyright rights.  That's been 
changing, though . . . .  Copyright owners have been advancing liberal 
constructions of the individual copyright rights in courts, in treaty negotiations, 
and in their copyright rhetoric. . . .  Bottom line for consumers: their historic 
copyright liberties to read, view, and listen to works are shrinking fast . . . . 
204. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
205. E.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2010).
206. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
207. E.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d,
547 U.S. 388 (2006) (“We therefore see no reason to depart from the general rule that courts will 
issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”). 
208. E.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569–91 (E.D. Va.
2007). 
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The same analysis could be applied to cases of creative hoarding. 
Specifically, by following the reasoning in Part III above as part of the 
fourth eBay factor (public interest), a judge may easily conclude that an 
author’s blanket refusal to license his creative work is injurious to the 
public interest, and that factor alone should (by the letter of the eBay rule) 
be enough to scuttle any possibility for an injunction to issue.  In this way, 
an author may retain his statutory right to exclude and have that right 
protected judicially on a case-by-case basis.  Evidence of a blanket right to 
exclude, however (perhaps via a class action suit or simply clear evidence 
that the author has refused to license the use of the work to anyone, despite 
an established market for the work), could overcome the presumptive 
validity of the author’s exclusionary right.209  By awarding the author 
damages equivalent to a license, a judge would effectively limit an author’s 
right to exclude the public while still guaranteeing appropriate 
compensation for the author’s creative product.210   
209. Cf. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186–87 (1st Cir.
1994) (holding that a copyright holder’s unilateral right to exclude is considered presumptively 
valid, with the burden on the alleged infringer to establish anticompetitive conduct sufficient to 
overcome such a presumption). 
210. Placing this sort of decision in the hands of judges would also prevent any unintended
evils of the law, specifically as applied to unpublished works.  An attempt to compel access to a 
private work or document (or an infringement suit brought by the owner of such a document) is 
far more likely to pass all four factors of the eBay test and yield an injunction, as the public has 
far less of a legitimate interest in a work not created for consumption.  See, e.g., Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554–55 (1985).  Justice O’Connor previewed her 
pro-exclusionary Stewart stance in Harper & Row, writing: 
It is true that common-law copyright was often enlisted in the service of 
personal privacy.  In its commercial guise, however, an author’s right to 
choose when he will publish is no less deserving of protection.  The period 
encompassing the work's initiation, its preparation, and its grooming for public 
dissemination is a crucial one for any literary endeavor.  The Copyright Act, 
which accords the copyright owner the “right to control the first public 
distribution” of his work, echos the common law's concern that the author or 
copyright owner retain control throughout this critical stage.  The obvious 
benefit to author and public alike of assuring authors the leisure to develop 
their ideas free from fear of expropriation outweighs any short-term “news 
value” to be gained from premature publication of the author's expression.  The 
author's control of first public distribution implicates not only his personal 
interest in creative control but his property interest in exploitation of 
prepublication rights, which are valuable in themselves and serve as a valuable 
adjunct to publicity and marketing.  Under ordinary circumstances, the author's 
right to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression 
will outweigh a claim of fair use. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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This approach may in effect hoist on their own petard proponents of the 
right to hoard based solely on judicial precedent.  The Fox Film Court was 
content to equate copyright law with patent law, and subsequent courts 
have been content to equate the language of that Court with the ubiquitous 
right to exclude.211  While this author does not agree with either legal 
conclusion, accepting the easy parallelism between the two forms of law 
would also require acceptance of the robust availability in copyright law of 
compulsory licensing as a judicial remedy for a patentee’s anticompetitive 
refusal to deal.212  The right to exclude in patent law is checked by the 
possibility of a court imposing a compulsory license if a patentee abuses 
the government-granted right; surely the same right granted to copyright 
owners213 should be checked by the same remedy. 
2. Deposing the Stewart Dynasty
In order for a judge to apply the eBay factors to effectuate a limitation
on an author’s right to hoard, that judge must also cope with the fairly 
explicit language in Stewart asserting that an author does, indeed, have the 
right to hoard his work for the entire term of copyright protection.214  
Getting past this language can be accomplished in one of several ways. 
First, like Fox Film, the hoarding language in Stewart is dictum 
incidental to the holding of the case.  Further, as one commentator notes, 
because the case was specifically about an author’s heirs retaining the 
ability to exercise their renewal right, Justice O’Connor’s language can be 
interpreted to refer only to an author’s (or the author’s surviving heirs’) 
211. E.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 227 (1990).
212. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219–20 (9th
Cir. 1997).  In Kodak, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding of an anticompetitive 
refusal to license their patents: Kodak photocopy and micrographics equipment requires 
thousands of parts, of which only sixty-five were patented.  Unlike the other cases involving 
refusals to license patents, this case concerns a blanket refusal that included protected and 
unprotected products.  From this evidence, it is more probable than not that the jury would have 
found Kodak's presumptively valid business justification rebutted on the grounds of pretext.  Id.  
The court then reviewed the lower court’s grant of an injunction compelling Kodak to license its 
patents to the plaintiff.  Id. at 1224 (“Last, Kodak challenges the district court's ten year 
permanent injunction requiring Kodak to sell all parts to all ISOs at reasonable prices.”). 
Although the district court affirmed the injunction, it modified it to allow Kodak to sell its 
products at normal monopoly prices.  Id. at 1225–26 (“Kodak should be permitted to charge all of 
its customers, including end users (both self-servicers and those under service contracts with 
Kodak), service companies contracting with Kodak and ISOs, any nondiscriminatory price that 
the market will bear.”). 
213. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 425 (1908) (“[W]henever
this court has had occasion to speak, it has decided that an inventor receives from a patent the 
right to exclude others from its use for the time prescribed in the statute.”). 
214. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 227 (1990).
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right to hoard his renewal right for the full copyright term.215  In other 
words, Justice O’Connor may have been protecting the initial purpose of 
the renewal right—to allow authors a way to remove themselves and their 
work from unremunerative transfers and renegotiate on more favorable 
terms after a work is successful—by signaling that an author’s heirs may 
not be compelled to relicense a work’s renewal term if the provisions of the 
deal are not favorable enough.216  Even if the Stewart language was read 
more broadly to apply to all implicated rights, not just the renewal term, the 
only right at issue in the case was the renewal term of the derivative right. 
As established above, the right to hoard is most justified when it implicates 
the derivative right, but significantly less justified when it implicates any of 
the other rights, particularly those that cut to the heart of a given work (the 
display right for pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, for example).217  A 
future court could find an author’s unwillingness to license derivative 
works based on their preexisting work (like J. D. Salinger) completely 
consistent with the Stewart holding and justified under a property rights 
analysis.218  But the same court could find that same author’s unwillingness 
to distribute the work to the public in any form (say, an author’s own 
refusal to distribute the work accompanied by a refusal to license the 
distribution right to a willing publisher), where such a work had already 
been “published” in some way (possibly by an earlier but now out-of-print 
release), contrary to public policy.  In this later scenario, a rogue publisher 
who violates the author’s distribution right would still be infringing; the 
215. Parrish, supra note 130, at 579–80.  Parrish writes:
It is possible, since the question in Stewart concerned licensing for the renewal
term, that Justice O'Connor meant that an author could hoard the right of
renewal.  This narrow interpretation would be more in keeping with
constitutional goals, because the work would already have been published and
any further progress during the renewal period would be minimal.  If authors
were allowed to hoard their works at any time, however, progress certainly
would not be promoted.  It is difficult to promote progress if a work is not
disseminated to the public.  Justice O'Connor indicated that the statutory term
limit is adequate to promote progress.  Yet, as copyright terms increase this
provides rather flaccid protection.
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
216. See id.
217. See Gervais, supra note 165, at 805–10 (offering six principles and a mode of analysis
to distinguish between the derivative right and the reproduction right); supra Part III.C. 
218. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2010) (“The plaintiff's interest is, principally, a
property interest in the copyrighted material.”); see also Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 
268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated on other grounds, (“Just as licensing of derivatives is an important 
economic incentive to the creation of originals, so too will the right not to license derivatives 
sometimes act as an incentive to the creation of originals.”). 
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court would merely assign damages in the form of a reasonable royalty 
with no injunctive relief, effectively sanctioning infringement in limited 
circumstances such as this one for the price of a fair license. 
Second, the Stewart Court’s treatment of Rohauer is instructive. 
Although the two cases reached opposite conclusions regarding the same 
issue (whether legally withdrawing the underlying rights from a derivative 
work can prevent the derivative work author from continuing to distribute 
the work), Stewart declined to overrule the earlier Second Circuit case.219  
Instead, the Court noted that “the Rohauer rule is considered to be an 
interest-balancing approach” and that it “ma[de] little sense when applied 
across the derivative-works spectrum.”220  By explicitly noting that, 
“[w]hile the result in Rohauer might make some sense in some contexts, it 
makes no sense in others,” the Stewart court was implicitly approving such 
a balancing-of-the-interests approach.221  In this way, Stewart would 
implicitly support the policy-balancing approach of eBay detailed above in 
determining the necessary remedy in a right-to-hoard infringement case and 
would, in fact, have very little to say about the remedy itself—the Stewart 
language applies only to whether or not infringement occurred at all.222 
Finally, though nearly sixty years more recent than Fox Film, the 
Stewart precedent faces the same issue as the Lochner-era case: it is too 
old.  Times have changed.  The Court argues, “[I]t is not our role to alter 
the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve.”  Yet since that 1990 
decision the balance has been altered: Congress extended all copyright 
terms by twenty years in 1998,223 greatly reducing the present “public 
benefit” (i.e., value) of a work that will be unavailable to the public until it 
enters the public domain at the end of its copyright term.  Where the 
219. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 227 (1990).  Though Justice O’Connor is far from
convinced that Rohauer was decided correctly (“[N]either the 1909 Act nor the 1976 Act 
provides support for the theory set forth in Rohau.”; “[T]he approach set forth in Rohauer is 
problematic”), she declines to overrule it, and instead minimizes its effect on the current law, 
(“While the result in Rohauer might make some sense in some context it makes no sense in 
others”; “Rohauer did not announce a ‘rule,’ but rather an ‘interest-balancing approach’” (citing 
Peter Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public 
Interest, 28 UCLA L. REV. 715, 758–61 (1981))).  Ultimately, rather than overruling it, she refers 
to the Rohauer holding as “modest.” Id. at 230. 
220. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 227.
221. The Rohauer court ruled based on the fact-specific policy interests of that case, but
those same interests were different (because the facts were necessarily different) in Stewart, 
necessitating a different result.  Id. at 227. 
222. Id. at 216 (“The Court of Appeals also addressed at length the proper remedy, an issue
not relevant to the issue on which we granted certiorari.”). 
223. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–304). 
201x] NONEXISTENT RIGHT TO HOARD 135
balancing of the interests has changed so explicitly, and where an author is 
not holding out for better negotiating terms (as in Stewart), but instead 
simply issuing a blanket refusal to make their works available under any 
circumstances, the Stewart reasoning does not withstand the test of time. 
Stewart should not prove an obstacle to a court’s ability to award a 
reasonable royalty for the continued use of a previously hoarded work by 
an infringer. 
B. Preventing the Right to Hoard Internationally
Although protection against hoarding would be difficult to achieve
statutorily in the United States, model language for such a provision 
already exists internationally.  Article III of the Appendix to the Berne 
Convention outlines an opt-in system by which developing countries may 
require that any work by a national of that country that is published, but not 
made available to the public, for five years following the date of first 
publication (or seven years in the case of fiction, poetry, music, drama, or 
art books), be made available via a nonexclusive license to the public at 
large of that country “at a price reasonably related to that normally charged 
in the country for comparable works.”224  This provision was designed as a 
means by which authors of developing countries may derive some income 
where they lack the means to reproduce and distribute their work (and 
where large-scale creative distributors are scarce), but such a provision 
could apply with equal force to a non-developing country as well. 
Countries with a strong moral rights basis for their copyright laws are less 
likely to adopt such a provision, as it could be viewed as taking a right 
away from authors (the unequivocal right to exclude), which moral rights 
countries (and, truthfully, utilitarian countries as well) are disinclined to do.  
Nevertheless, the fact that such language already exists in an 
international agreement lays the groundwork for a broader limitation on an 
author’s right to hoard that could be implemented in the future.  As 
currently written, Appendix Article III of Berne is protective of authors 
who lack the means or understanding to monetize their work.  If such a 
scheme can be considered helpful to authors and to a national creative 
economy in one country, it can hardly be considered injurious to authors 
and users in another country (even one with a more established creative 
economy).  After all, an author need only make his work available on his 
own terms within a generous seven-year time frame in order to render the 
224. Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works app. art. 3, Sept. 9,
1886, revised by Paris Act on July 24, 1971 (amended July 24, 1979), 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 
U.N.T.S. 221, [hereinafter Berne Convention] (emphasis added), available at www.wipo.int/treati 
es/ en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf. 
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provision moot.225  This provision, if expanded to all Berne member 
countries, would only go into effect (once a country were to adopt the 
Berne language into its own legislation) on the rare occasion that an author 
publishes a work but does not release it to the public.  Such an experiment 
should lead to increased access and, most importantly for the United States’ 
utilitarian copyright scheme, an additional incentive for an author to 
affirmatively monetize his work. 
V. Conclusion
Blanket hoarding of creative work does not occur very often. 
Copyright authors and owners are generally motivated by a desire to profit 
from the release of copyrighted work to the public in some form.  But 
authors and copyright owners do remove public access to creative works 
from time to time, whether to increase demand for the work, respond to 
market forces, or simply to reflect the creative dissatisfaction of the author. 
Regardless of the motivation, however, the removal of public access to a 
creative work is undoubtedly injurious to the public, and the ever-receding 
moment in time where such a work will enter into the public domain offers 
a virtually nonexistent chance that the public will ever be able to recapture 
the work.   
An author or copyright owner should not be permitted to prevent public 
access to a creative work, once published.  Such behavior is contrary to a 
proper analysis of copyright as property and is similarly contrary to the 
utilitarian justifications for the U.S. copyright scheme.  The Supreme Court 
language ostensibly espousing an authorial right to hoard has been 
misinterpreted for decades and in any event has long passed the point of 
relevance under the current U.S. copyright system.  Judges faced with 
infringement suits in these circumstances should use the flexibility afforded 
to them in eBay to award a reasonable royalty for the distribution of a 
previously hoarded work, rather than preventing public distribution via an 
injunction.  In the long term, the United States (along with its fellow Berne 
member countries) should consider adopting statutory language similar to 
the provision in Appendix Article III of the Berne Convention permitting 
statutory licensing of published, but unavailable, creative works in 
developing countries.  Without some affirmative steps to protect the public, 
the increasing scope of author protection combined with the increasing 
term of copyright protection endangers all public access to creative work—
the very premise on which U.S. copyright law is based. 
225. Id.
